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ARTICLE

Lobbying and the Petition Clause
Maggie McKinley*
Abstract. Contrary to popular opinion, the Supreme Court has not yet resolved whether
lobbying is constitutionally protected. Belying this fact, courts, Congress, and scholars
mistakenly assume that lobbying is protected under the Petition Clause. Because scholars
have shared the mistaken assumption that the Petition Clause protects the practice of
“lobbying,” no research to date has looked closely at the Petition Clause doctrine and the
history of petitioning in relation to lobbying. In a recent opinion addressing petitioning in
another context, the Supreme Court unearthed the long history behind the right to
petition and argued for the importance of this history for future interpretation of the
Petition Clause.
Following the Supreme Court’s direction, this Article examines the implications of the
history of petitioning for lobbying and, drawing from recent empirical research on
lobbying, argues that the way Congress engages with the public through our current
lobbying system actually violates the right to petition. At the Founding, and for much of
this Nation’s history, the right to petition protected a formal, transparent platform for
individual—and, in particular, minority—voices to participate in the lawmaking process.
Without regard to the number of signers or the political power of the petitioner, petitions
received equal process and consideration. This platform allowed both the enfranchised and
unenfranchised to gain access to lawmakers on equal footing. Women, African Americans,
and Native Americans all engaged in petitioning activity, and Congress attended to each
equally.
Moving beyond ahistorical, decontextualized interpretations of the Petition Clause, this
Article posits that our current lobbying system—wherein access and procedure are
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informal, opaque, and based on political power—actually violates the right to petition,
which provided access and formal procedure without respect to the political power of the
petitioner. The history of petitioning teaches that affording access to the lawmaking
process on the basis of an individual’s political power makes as little sense as affording
access to courts on such a basis.
This history suggests the need for revisiting the Petition Clause doctrine. On the one hand,
it argues for a stronger petition right, especially a right to consideration and response. On
the other hand, it suggests a narrowed petition right that protects only practices that
correspond with the traditional practice of petitioning. Fundamentally, this Article
demonstrates that a contextualized understanding of the Petition Clause, grounded in an
accurate historical frame, requires comprehensive reform of our lobbying system and a
formalization of the petition process in order to preserve our republican form of
government.
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Introduction
Imagine that when you filed a complaint in a court, the judge first
reviewed the document to count the number of signatures or to determine
whether any of the signers had contributed to the judge’s campaign. If the judge
identified enough signatures or identified the signature of a contributor, the
judge might accept your filing; otherwise, she might refuse to accept the
complaint and decline to hear the case entirely. Even if she allowed the case to
proceed, the judge might hold the proceedings in secret, meeting informally
with parties and individuals unrelated to your action, and refuse to make
public any of the filings in the action. If the judge held a close relationship with
a powerful individual interested in the case, she might allow that third party to
send her instructions by text message that would guide her questions and
actions during trial. The judge might also afford you entirely different process
than other litigants: if she thought that you were politically powerful, she
might provide you comprehensive hearings and a trial. Otherwise, she might
allow you a five-minute phone conference without ever reading your
submissions. She might also provide you no process at all, abandoning your
complaint to a wastepaper basket. There is little doubt that this scenario would
offend deeply our notions of the right to due process in the context of courts
because we believe that the right means equal, formal, and public process. That
we accept less when we, as members of the public, engage with Congress
appears more historical accident than anything grounded in reason.
Congress’s engagement with the public outside of the vote inevitably
presents challenging regulatory and constitutional questions. On the one hand,
lawmakers have a strong need to gather information about the public to
facilitate the lawmaking process, and the public is often the only source. The
Constitution also protects explicitly “the right . . . to petition,” or the right to
engage directly with government, “for a redress of grievances.”1 On the other
hand, our informal and largely unregulated lobbying system is prone to abuse,
risks disruption and distortion of our lawmaking process, and has contributed
to an alarming loss of public faith in Congress.2 The minimal scholarly debate
to engage with the puzzle of lobbying conflates lobbying and petitioning and
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The low approval rating and steep decline in confidence in Congress has been well

documented. See, e.g., Is Congress for Sale?, RASMUSSEN REP. ( July 9, 2015),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/mood_of_america_archive
/congressional_performance/is_congress_for_sale (reporting survey results that only
13% of respondents approved of Congress, with 56% responding that Congress does its
job “poorly” and 59% responding that most members are willing to sell their
votes); Rebecca Riffkin, Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low, GALLUP
( June 19, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again
-hits-historic-low.aspx (reporting survey results of only 7% of respondents having a
“great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress, down from 42% in 1973—the first
year of the survey).
1

1
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assumes away the question whether the First Amendment protects our current
lobbying system.3 Likely because of this assumption, few scholars have
considered whether lobbying and petitioning are coextensive and, if not, how
Congress ought to engage with the public in order to comport with the
petition right. The literature instead focuses narrowly on whether our current
lobbying system should or could be regulated4—or potentially even
subsidized5—in accordance with the Constitution. Little scholarly work has
been done to examine the contours of the right to petition in the context of our
current lobbying system and to answer the question of how a legislature of
republican design ought to engage with the public during the lawmaking
process, if at all.6 Despite presenting important questions regarding the
institutional design of our legislatures, the little attention these questions have
received by legal scholars and the courts has fostered only deeper confusion.
To resolve decades of confusion in a single article is a chimera. Rather, this
Article aims to reshape the dialogue regarding public engagement with
3. One telling example arises from the introductory article to the Stanford Law & Policy

Review’s special edition on lobbying. Alan B. Morrison, Introduction : Lobbyists—Saints or
Sinners?, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008). Alan Morrison opens his introduction to the
edition asking whether lobbyists are “saints” or “sinners.” Id. at 1 (capitalization
altered). He then quickly concludes that “the answer does not really matter . . . because,
as all the authors recognize, the right to lobby is the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment.” Id.
(making this statement without citation); see also Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of
Influence : The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160, 163 (2014); Richard
L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (2012);
Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups : Toward a Constitutional Right
to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 172 (1993). For a very recent and very rare
exception, see Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 6
(2014), which notes that the scope of the lobbying right is “unclear.”
4. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 3, at 197.
5. Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying : Lobbying,
Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 89-90 (2014);
Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, Remarks
at the Georgia State University Law Review Symposium (Nov. 12, 2010), in 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1155, 1167-68 (2011).
6. Notably, the terms “petition” and “lobbying” are not listed in the tables of contents or
indices of most First Amendment casebooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION AND CONSCIENCE (2003);
JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER (1992);
ARTHUR D. HELLMAN ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
FREEDOM OF RELIGION (3d ed. 2014); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY (2008); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1999); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (6th ed. 2015); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH
FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW (5th ed. 2013); EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS (4th
ed. 2011); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008).
1

1

1

1
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Congress. First, this Article seeks to unsettle the presumption that the Supreme
Court has resolved definitively that lobbying is protected by the First
Amendment. Second, this Article aims to clarify the reach and meaning of the
Petition Clause by charting the little-known history of the petition process and
the history of lobbying and by addressing the Petition Clause doctrine
comprehensively for the first time. Finally, the Article puts forth the
heterodox argument that our current lobbying system7 actually violates the
right to petition.
Although the Supreme Court often alludes in dicta to presumed
constitutional limitations on Congress’s ability to regulate our current
lobbying system,8 the Court has yet to resolve the issue. The two cases
generally cited for the principle that lobbying is protected under the Petition
Clause9 fail to support that claim. In the most often cited case, United States v.
Harriss, the Court actually declined explicitly to reach the issue whether the
statute’s penalty of a three-year lobbying ban violated the Petition Clause.10
The Court’s first in-depth discussion of lobbying and the Petition Clause, Noerr
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, interpreted lobbying activity as an exception
7. A definitional clarification is in order. Much of our discourse around “lobbying” fails to

distinguish between the private conduct of the individuals we call “lobbyists” and the
state action of Congress in providing access to the lawmaking process to those
individual lobbyists and others in order to “lobby.” It is the latter that is the focus of
this Article. Lobbyists, as individuals, can engage in a range of activities, including
running for office, contributing to electoral campaigns, and publishing op-eds, but
these individuals become lobbyists only by “lobbying,” or by engaging directly with
government, usually Congress. Engaging directly with Congress implicates more than
simply private conduct; it necessarily implies some form of reception or, at the very
least, acquiescence or acknowledgement from the other side. For example, a lobbyist
cannot engage in paradigmatic lobbying behavior—that is, a meeting with a member of
Congress—without the member affording the lobbyist access and process. This Article
takes the approach that this system of direct engagement with Congress—because it
implicates state action and raises distinct constitutional and regulatory concerns—
should be treated separately and refers to this system separately as our “lobbying
system.”
8. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“And the Court has upheld
registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power
to ban lobbying itself.” (emphasis added)). In United States v. Harriss, the Court upheld
disclosure requirements under an earlier version of the compelled-speech doctrine but
declined explicitly to reach the question whether the statute’s three-year lobbying ban
penalty violated the Petition Clause. 347 U.S. 612, 625-27 (1954).
9. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961);
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626-27.
10. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 627. The Court also mentioned the Petition Clause in its survey
application of the First Amendment to a mandatory disclosure requirement, but its
analysis of the requirement resembled more closely its doctrine on compelled speech—
the doctrine the Court applies today in the context of disclosure regimes. See, e.g., Doe
v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2010) (analyzing under the compelled-speech doctrine a
state statute compelling public disclosure of the names and addresses of petition
signers).
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to the Sherman Act in order to shield it from allegations of anticompetitive
conduct, citing Petition Clause concerns in part.11 As later cases have
highlighted, however, it is unclear whether the Court rested the NoerrPennington lobbying exception on the Petition Clause or on simple statutory
interpretation and the legislative history of the Act.12 The majority of case law
interpreting the Petition Clause focuses not on lobbying or even legislative
petitioning but on access to courts and formal agency proceedings.13 Belying
the nearly ubiquitous consensus that any and all forms of lobbying activity are
coextensive to petitioning and, therefore, are protected under the Petition
Clause, the constitutional protections for our current lobbying system remain
a very open question.
Looking to the historical record to clarify the reach and meaning of the
Petition Clause reveals that our lobbying system and the system protected by
the petition right are wholly distinct. At the Founding, and for much of this
Nation’s history, the right protected a form of access to Congress that more
closely resembled the formal process afforded in courts than the informal tool
of mass politics that lobbying and petitioning have become today.14 Individuals
submitted over six hundred petitions to the first Congress—each a formal
document that included a statement of grievance and a signatory list—which
members of Congress read aloud on the floor, referred to a committee or
another branch for consideration, and afforded a formal response.15 Women,
African Americans, and Native Americans had all engaged with colonial and

11. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
12. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2502-03 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. The most well-known contemporary example is the Obama Administration’s “We the

People” website that allows the public to “petition” the executive. WE THE PEOPLE,
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov (last visited May 5, 2016). The Obama Administration
describes the “We the People” petition website as a supplement to, not a displacement
of, the “current official methods of communication” with the executive. Terms of
Participation, WE THE PEOPLE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/how-why/terms
-participation (last visited May 5, 2016). As of January 2013, the Obama Administration
promises that petitions are made available to the public in a searchable database if the
petition garners 150 signatures in thirty days and promises an official response to
petitions that garner more than 100,000 signatures in thirty days. Id. The
website initially required only 5000 signatures in thirty days, but increasing use of
the website motivated the Obama Administration to increase the threshold for
response to 25,000 signatures and then 100,000. Macon Phillips, Why We’re Raising
the Signature Threshold for We the People, WHITE HOUSE ( Jan. 15, 2013, 6:00 PM
ET), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/01/15/why-we-re-raising-signature
-threshold-we-people. An examination of the historical petition right could call into
question the constitutionality of this novel model of petitioning the executive. See infra
Part III.A.
15. See infra Part I.A.
1

1136

Lobbying and the Petition Clause
68 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2016)

state governments through the petition process as a matter of course,16 and
these unenfranchised and politically powerless communities transitioned
smoothly to petitioning Congress after the Founding.17 Members did not
afford more process or consideration to petitions with more signatures and did
not require a minimum level of electoral power, or signature count, in order to
provide formal process to a petition.18 Much like a complaint filed with a
court, Congress treated each petition on equal footing—no matter the petition’s
source and without regard to the political power of the petitioner19—and
consideration was a public, transparent process.20
By contrast, the lobbying market functioned (and still functions) as the
antithesis of the formal petition process. Historically, the lobbying market
auctioned informal access to lawmakers—access acquired through bribes,
personal connections, threats, and electoral pressure.21 Lobbyists cultivated
relationships with members of Congress in order to offer their clients more
access and more comprehensive process than those individuals who engaged in
the formal petition process.22 Professional lobbyists might themselves engage
in petitioning, and petitioners might, on occasion, employ lobbyists to
represent them in the formal petition process.23 The lobbying industry,
however, was largely distinct from the formal petition process and inspired
incredible public resentment at the fact that lobbyists circumvented and
undermined the legitimate system of public engagement—namely,
petitioning.24 State governments criminalized lobbying, and courts were quick
to void contracts for lobbying services as violative of public policy because
they saw the sale of one’s own personal, informal access as a corruption of
petitioning.25 In most cases, the courts were clear that engaging in the formal
petition process or hiring a representative to engage in the formal petition

16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power : Gentility and Lobbying in the
1

22.
23.
24.
25.

Early Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 57, 57-99 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon
eds., 2002) [hereinafter HOUSE AND SENATE] (surveying petitions submitted to Congress
during the 1790s and noting the advantages gentility afforded to individuals seeking to
influence the early Congress).
Id. at 58-62.
Id. at 60-65.
Id. at 60-61.
Teachout, supra note 3, at 7.
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process on your behalf would not raise the same concerns;26 such contracts
might even obtain constitutional protection.27 It was only in contracting for
“lobbying” services—specifically, the sale of a lobbyist’s ability to circumvent
the formal petition process—that public policy was offended.28
The historical process of petitioning bears little resemblance to the way
that Congress engages with the public today. Today, Congress affords
individuals access to lawmakers and the lawmaking process only on an
informal basis and provides preferential access, consideration, and procedure to
the politically powerful.29 Gone is the public process whereby petitions were
read into the congressional record, and in its place is a process closed to public
scrutiny,30 with little to no public record outside of the compelled selfdisclosure reports mandated by the Lobbying Disclosure Act.31 In essence, our
legitimate petitioning right has been supplanted by the illegitimate lobbying
system that was seen as undermining the right to petition. We have
increasingly taken this substitution for granted.32 But the history of

26. See, e.g., Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 449-50 (1874) (voiding a lobbying

27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

32.

contingency fee contract as against public policy and distinguishing the lobbying
contract from a contract for “purely professional services” such as “drafting [a]
petition . . . attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, [and] preparing
arguments . . . to a committee or other proper authority”).
See, e.g., Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 334-36 (1853) (holding
contracts “to use personal or any secret or sinister influence on legislators” or
contingency fee contracts as void against public policy but noting that all affected have
an “undoubted right” to urge their claims before legislative committees so long as it is
done honestly, openly, and candidly).
Trist, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 448-50.
See infra Part IV.A.
Id.
2 U.S.C. § 1604 (2014). The disclosure regime of the Lobbying Disclosure Act has also
been widely criticized as ineffective and out of date. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FED.
LOBBYING LAWS, AM. BAR ASS’N, LOBBYING LAW IN THE SPOTLIGHT: CHALLENGES AND
PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS, at vii (2011).
A recent example occurred in a challenge to the Obama Administration’s policy of
banning lobbyists from serving on certain advisory commissions. See Autor v.
Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The administration had campaigned on
an antilobbyist platform and, after taking office, implemented a number of restrictions
on lobbyist engagement with the executive, including the advisory commission ban.
Bob Bauer, Assessing Lobbying Reform in the Obama Administration, Presentation to
the American University Conference on Lobbying Reform in the U.S. and the E.U.
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/upload/Bauer-remarks.pdf. A
cohort of lobbyists challenged the ban as an unconstitutional condition on their
petition rights. Autor, 740 F.3d at 177-78. During the litigation, the Obama
Administration conceded that lobbying was protected by the Petition Clause, despite the
fact that the Supreme Court has yet to wholly resolve the issue. Id. at 182 (“[T]he
government acknowledges, as it must, that registered lobbyists are protected by the
First Amendment right to petition.”); see also infra Part III.B. The administration
subsequently declined to appeal the adverse ruling and instead withdrew the ban.
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petitioning teaches that our procedural rights to engage with legislatures and
our procedural due process rights in courts should not be so distinct.
What little effort Congress has undertaken to regulate lobbying and the
little doctrine that has developed around the Petition Clause have yet to
recognize this history. Instead our regulatory frameworks and doctrine simply
assume that lobbying and petitioning are coextensive and reflect the struggle
to define the petition right against a background of changed circumstances. In
the absence of any context to provide meaning to the Petition Clause, in 1985
the Court eventually conflated the right to petition with the Free Speech
Clause in McDonald v. Smith.33 However, the Supreme Court has recently
indicated that it could be receptive to the history of petitioning when
reinvigorating the Petition Clause. Following McDonald, scholars rushed to
unearth the history of petitioning in order to criticize the Court’s conflation of
the Petition and Free Speech Clauses and to argue for a distinctive Petition
Clause doctrine grounded in that history.34 In 2011, the Supreme Court, citing
the long-established importance of history in interpreting the First
Amendment,35 relied on this newly unearthed history in the context of judicial
and executive “petitioning” to establish a Petition Clause doctrine distinct from
free speech.36
Part I follows the Court’s lead in Guarnieri and provides a thick
description37 of the Petition Clause in order to clarify our Petition Clause

33. 472 U.S. 479, 480 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution : The History and Significance of the
1

Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998) (excavating the history of petitioning
and arguing for a distinctive Petition Clause doctrine); Eric Schnapper, “Libelous”
Petitions for Redress of Grievances—Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV.
303 (1989) (same); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .” : An Analysis of
the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986) (same);
Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of
Grievances : Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993) (same); Stephen
A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition the Government for Redress of
Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986) (same). The burgeoning discourse of historical
scholarship around the Petition Clause even fostered dissent. See, e.g., Gary Lawson &
Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 740-41 (1999).
35. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2498 (2011) (“Some effort must be
made to identify the historic and fundamental principles that led to the enumeration
of the right to petition in the First Amendment, among other rights fundamental to
liberty.”).
36. Id. at 2495 (“Courts should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the
two Clauses or that Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in every case resolve
Petition Clause claims. Interpretation of the Petition Clause must be guided by the
objectives and aspirations that underlie the right. A petition conveys the special
concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action by the
government to address those concerns.” (citations omitted)).
37. Modeling the Supreme Court’s method of interpretation in Guarnieri, this Article
draws upon historical sources as a means to contextualize or provide a “thick
1

1
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doctrine with respect to legislative petitioning. In particular, Part I aims to
contextualize the Petition Clause within the history of the text’s drafting, the
history of petitioning, and the history of the distinct practice of lobbying.38

description” in order to understand the meaning ascribed to these terms. This method
relies heavily on the work of semiotician and anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who
advocated a “thick description” or contextualization of a focus of inquiry in order to
understand its meaning. Clifford Geertz, Thick Description : Toward an Interpretative
Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 14 (1973).
Legal historian Saul Cornell has commented that an historical application of Gricean
pragmatics would resemble a Geertzian thick description and has remarked upon
Geertz’s recent contribution to historical methodology. Saul Cornell, The People’s
Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution : Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate
over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 302 n.25 (2011).
38. We have, in our constitutional culture, become tribal. To point to text and history, at
least for some, is to join ranks with the tribe of originalists and the ideology that
imbues that tribe. Although I am quite supportive of tribalism in other contexts, I find
this simplification of methodology problematic. Clearing the theoretical thicket
around the differences between the use of text and history and the methodology called
“originalism” is beyond the scope of this Article. I reserve this question for later work,
where I might clear the thicket more precisely. But a point of clarification is in order
here to avoid any distraction prompted by this methodological tribalism.
Praising fidelity to constitutional text within historical context is an acceptable means
of constitutional interpretation within a range of methodologies, including Dworkin’s
moral reading. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity : Originalism, Scalia,
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1251-52 (1997). In reaching a “moral
reading,” Dworkin claims that we must first look to constitutional text to resolve the
“best sense of the Framers speaking as they did in the context in which they spoke.” Id.
at 1253. In particular, we must look to the meaning of the text at the time of the
Framing in order to resolve whether the text involves a set meaning or an abstract
principle. Id. It is only the latter that involves a moral reading. Id. (contrasting the
abstract terms of “cruel” within the Eighth Amendment and “equal” within the
Fourteenth Amendment against the constitutional requirement that the President
meet or exceed the age of thirty-five). Constitutional text with a fixed meaning,
according to Dworkin, is subject to a form of textualism even when applying the
moral reading methodology. Id. at 1251-52. In describing his form of textualism, a
method that he claimed to share with Justice Scalia and Laurence Tribe, Dworkin
provides an example apropos of the Petition Clause. Id. at 1256-62.
In describing his moral reading methodology, Dworkin points to history to resolve
ambiguities in meaning for these nonabstract constitutional terms and, to illustrate, he
describes a passage from Shakespeare’s Hamlet where Hamlet “said to his sometime
friends, ‘I know a hawk from a handsaw.’” Id. at 1251 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
HAMLET act 2, sc. 2). But the question arises “whether Hamlet was using the word
‘hawk’ that designates a kind of a bird, or the different word that designates a
Renaissance tool.” Id. at 1251. To resolve this question, “[w]e must begin, in my view, by
asking what—on the best evidence available—the authors of the text in question
intended to say” and “[i]f we apply that standard to Hamlet, it’s plain that we must read
his claim as referring not to a bird, which would make the claim an extremely silly
one, but to a renaissance tool.” Id. at 1252. So it would appear that, in calling for textual
fidelity to the term “petition” in the Petition Clause, I would likely have the spirits of
both Dworkin and Scalia on my side.
1
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This Part focuses on the little-known history of petitioning, a formal practice
that once constituted a vital mechanism of the legislative process.
In Part II, I present the regulatory and doctrinal muddle around lobbying
and the Petition Clause doctrine as a prime case study in the problems that arise
from textualist interpretive methods that fail to take account of context39—in
this case, an early and highly criticized version of textualism developed by
Hugo Black that interpreted the Petition Clause without reference to the
history that would have provided a clarified and stable meaning to the text.40
In particular, Part II advances the argument that interpreting constitutional
text, in the absence of a contextualized understanding of petitioning and
lobbying, resulted in an overbroad and inconsistent application of the Clause.
Part III relies on the thick description of petitioning to argue for a partial
revisitation of the Petition Clause doctrine. Part III first argues that the Court
should narrow the right to petition and disambiguate “petitioning” from
“lobbying.” Specifically, it posits that the petition right protects only direct
engagement with government and that the right would not protect other
forms of “lobbying,” including informal engagement with government or
public-directed advocacy. Part III then argues that the Court should strengthen
the right to petition to guarantee equal and open access to the legislature
through a formal, public process and to guarantee consideration and response.
Lastly, Part III provides two examples of implications for the Petition Clause
doctrine.
Part IV describes findings from recent political science studies that show
that our current lobbying system does not afford equal, formal access to
lawmakers. Rather, the data show that Congress affords access to the
lawmaking process both on an informal basis and sorted by the political power

39. Although statutory and constitutional interpretation scholarship has taken a

definitive pragmatic or contextualized turn in the last few decades, what constitutes
“context” is an underdeveloped question in legal scholarship. See PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 1-13 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds.,
2011); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951-55
(1995); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392-93 (2003);
John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 165; Victoria F. Nourse,
Elementary Statutory Interpretation : Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 1613, 1614-16 (2014); Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional
Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1124-39 (2015). In an effort to begin to remedy this
theoretical hole in interpretive scholarship, this Article draws from the fields of neoGricean sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology which have, with the support of
empirical study, systematically begun to model context in everyday language use. See,
e.g., STEPHEN LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 22-23 (1983); Allessandro Duranti & Charles
Goodwin, Rethinking Context : An Introduction, in RETHINKING CONTEXT: LANGUAGE AS
AN INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 1, 1-32 (Allessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin eds.,
1992); Elinor Ochs, Introduction : What Child Language Can Contribute to Pragmatics, in
DEVELOPMENTAL PRAGMATICS 1, 1-17 (Elinor Ochs & Bambi B. Schieffelin eds., 1979).
40. See infra Part II.B.
1
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of the petitioner. Based on these findings, Part IV explores the implications of a
contextualized right to petition for our current lobbying system, concluding
that our current lobbying system actually violates the right to petition. In
particular, this Part argues that a contextualized understanding of petitioning,
and the republican values it preserved, could move the debate around lobbying
reform away from a fixation on registration and disclosure regimes that simply
force transparency within the current taken-for-granted system and toward an
affirmative vision of how Congress ought to engage with the public during the
lawmaking process.
I.

Contextualizing the Petition Clause
A. Contextualizing Petitioning

In a strange sense, the year 2015 marked the eight hundredth anniversary
of the American right to petition.41 Magna Charta,42 a document signed under
duress by a reviled English king, might seem at first blush an odd document on
which to build our history of American petitioning.43 But, for the colonists, the
document formed a fundamental illustration of the rights and liberties they felt
were foundational in their struggle against the British Crown.44 Benjamin
Franklin noted the anniversary of Magna Charta for readers of his Poor
Richard’s Almanack in 1749, to mark the day in remembrance of the
document.45 During the Revolutionary era, Magna Charta took on new life as a
model for the demands of independence as it had, by Thomas Paine’s
estimation, demanded liberties for all men and had been “formed, not in the
senate, but in the field; and insisted on by the people, not granted by the
crown.”46 His revolutionary advocacy in Common Sense urged the colonists to
draft a document of independent government that would “answer[] to what is
called the Magna Charta of England.”47
The colonists, an unenfranchised and politically powerless minority,
justified the Revolution with and rooted an independent American
sovereignty in the failure of the British Crown to comply with its procedural
obligations within the petition process and to respond to the colonists’
41. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER
OF KING JOHN 466-67 (1914).

42. As is customary among early Americanist historians, I adopt the eighteenth- and
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

nineteenth-century spelling of the document common at the Founding.
MCKECHNIE, supra note 41, at 466-67.
See id.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK (1749).
THOMAS PAINE, The Forester’s Letter III (1776), reprinted in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED
WRITINGS 74, 81 (1955).
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 31-32 (1776).
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petitions.48 The Revolutionary era’s Continental Congress petitioned49 King
George III twice in an effort to avoid full independence from Britain and the
war that would necessarily precede it.50 The first petition was “huddled” into
Parliament “amongst a bundle of American papers, and there neglected.”51
Despite the failure of the first attempt, the Continental Congress adopted the
second petition, termed the “Olive Branch Petition,” on July 8, 1775 and
enlisted Richard Penn, former governor of Pennsylvania, to deliver it to the
King.52 But the King refused to receive the colonists’ olive branch, and they
were told that because he would not formally receive the petition at his throne,
he would provide no response.53 Following its list of grievances, the
Declaration of Independence54 grounded the right to sovereignty and
ultimately to war in the failure of the King to respond:
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the
most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by
repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which
may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.55

Hardly mentioned at all during the Constitutional Convention, the document
constituted an icon of American Revolutionary independence and an historical
and moral authority in support of American protest.
Paine was correct that the original document was an act of political
protest. In May of 1215, around forty English barons overtook London in an
act of rebellion against King John.56 The following month, the King sued for

48. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

133 (1997).
49. According to Pauline Maier, under English law, a petition was a form of “address” that

asked something of the King. Petitions of right
had a particularly important place in English practice. They gave subjects a way of seeking
redress of wrongs done under the authority of the King, whom they could not sue in the
regular courts. Petitions of right asked for the recognition of undoubted rights, not mercy, and
were directed at the King as the font of justice.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 55.
Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS para.
6 (U.S. 1775)).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Declarations, according to Maier, occupied a different function under English law than
petitions. “A declaration was a particularly emphatic pronouncement or proclamation
that was often explanatory: from the fourteenth century ‘declaration’ implied ‘making
clear’ or ‘telling.’ . . . But the word ‘declaration’ also referred to a legal instrument, a
written statement of claims served on the defendant at the commencement of a civil
action.” Id. at 94.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S. 1776).
MCKECHNIE, supra note 41, at 35.
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peace and agreed to give audience to the barons and their demands and to
provide a formal response.57 The document of demands presented by the
barons and grudgingly signed by the King later became known as the Magna
Charta, Latin for “the Great Charter.”58 But Paine’s description of the document
as securing broad rights was historical fiction. In grudgingly fixing his seal to
the charter, the King granted his barons—hardly the common man envisioned
by Paine—future audience before the Crown to present petitions.59 Petitioners
would present petitions, along with a statement of grievances, and would often
offer to finance the government in exchange for granting the petition.60 Not
surprisingly, as the financial needs of the Crown increased, so did the volume
of petitions afforded an audience before the King.61 Some have speculated that
exponential increase in petitioning led eventually to the institutionalization of
Parliament, a term used during the period to denote a discussion and,
especially, a formal discussion between the King and those given audience in
his court.62
In Parliament, petitioning often drove the legislative agenda, which
included petitions for public and private matters without any mechanism to
distinguish them.63 Gregory Mark has argued that it was because of the quasijudicial nature of petitions and the quasi-judicial role of Parliament that
Parliament developed an obligation to consider all petitions equally and the
public fostered a growing sense of the right to formal consideration of and a
response to their petitions.64 The petitions also allowed Parliament to expand
its power vis-à-vis the King.65 The King was dependent on Parliament and, as
the barons had earlier done, Parliament conditioned the granting of money on
the King first redressing the petitions submitted to him from Parliament.66
Petitioning became an intrinsic part of English political life by the seventeenth
century, the words “petition” and “bill” were used interchangeably in
legislatures, and the petition process was regarded as part of the constitutional
framework.67 Notably, petitioning also served as the primary means of
political engagement for the unenfranchised and for collective political

57. Id. at 38.
58. Id.
59. See Mark, supra note 34, at 2165-66.
60. Spanbauer, supra note 34, at 22-23.
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id.
63. See Mark, supra note 34, at 2166.
64. Id. at 2166-67.
65. Id. at 2167.
66. Id.
67. K. Smellie, Right of Petition, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98, 98 (Edwin

R.A. Seligman ed., 1933).
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activity, as petitioners formed associations and petitioned on behalf of the
collectivity.68
English colonists of North America brought with them the English
practice of petitioning and began to expand and extend the practice to fit
within their new political context.69 Colonial charters reaffirmed the colonists’
right to petition in over fifty provisions, and many colonial assemblies
reaffirmed the right.70 When the Massachusetts General Court established the
Body of Liberties in 1641, the first legal code developed by English settlers, it
codified the right to petition and articulated its contours in very inclusive
terms:
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free shall have libertie to
come to any publique Court, Councell, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or
writing to move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any
necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that meeting
hath proper cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order, and
respective manner.71

Colonists exercising these broad petition rights petitioned on a broad range of
matters, spanning from matters of general applicability in the “public interest”
to very individual grievances, including many disputes that did not fit in
neatly to an existing judicial cause of action.72 The petition process also began
to manifest some of the dynamics of modern day interest group politics.73
Petitions often addressed the economic needs of different associations, and
colonial governments used the petition process, including the review of
counterpetitions from competing groups, to negotiate between competing
economic interests within their developing economies.74
In addition to associational activity, the petition process also catered to the
needs of individuals and political minorities.75 Like the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, many colonial governments either explicitly or implicitly opened
the petition process to the unenfranchised and disenfranchised, and these

68. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 34, at 2169-70.
69. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 25
(1986).
See Mark, supra note 34, at 2175 n.90.
A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New England, in 1 DOCUMENTS ON
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION 122, 124 (Zechariah
Chafee, Jr. ed., 1963).
See Higginson, supra note 34, at 145.
See id. at 150-51.
Id.
See, e.g., RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 44 (1979).
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groups took full advantage of the process.76 Prisoners petitioned in quasihabeas terms to alter judgments, but they also petitioned to alter sentences and
for broader criminal justice reform.77 Women petitioned to redress private
grievances and joined men in petitioning on matters of broader public
concern.78 While less common, colonial governments also saw petitions from
slaves and free African Americans.
In one poignant example, the Virginia legislature heard, considered, and
granted a petition by “[a] group of mulattoes and free blacks” to exempt their
wives and daughters from a tax imposed on black women and not white
women.79 In 1769, the Colony of Virginia collected a “head tax,” or a flat tax,
from all residents.80 The tax applied to all men, both white and black.81 But the
tax applied only to black women, meaning that white women did not have to
pay the tax.82 A group of mixed-race and free blacks took issue with the tax on
black women and decided to exercise their right to petition.83 As surprising as
it may sound to our modern ears, the Virginia Assembly treated the petition as
it did all others.84 The document became part of the formal record of the
legislature.85 Following formal consideration and review, “both houses of the
assembly and the governor agreed that the request was reasonable” and they
passed a law exempting black women from the tax.86 Native Americans
petitioned also, often including explicit reference to their tribal identity, most
commonly to redress concerns over tribal land claims.87
That the Articles of Confederation mentioned petitioning only in the
context of the rights of states should come as little surprise given the limited
jurisdiction and structure of the federal government under the Articles.88 The
newly formed state constitutions, however, were quick to include the right.89
Pennsylvania, with its long history of participatory politics, and Vermont

76. Smith, supra note 34, at 1170-72.
77. Mark, supra note 34, at 2181-82.
78. BAILEY, supra note 75, at 44.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 45.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter, Indigenous Representation by Petition: Transformations in

Iroquois Complaint and Request, 1680-1760, at 14-15 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
88. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, paras. 2-3.
89. Mark, supra note 34, at 2199-2203.
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bestowed a broad right to petition on all “people” within the state.90 As they did
in Parliament, petitions drove the legislative agenda of the colonial and state
governments.91 Volunteer farmers and other part-time support staffed these
nascent governing bodies, and the petitions offered a steady stream of welcome
information.92 Given the ubiquity of the practice in eighteenth-century
America, it was taken for granted that the U.S. Constitution would include the
right to petition in its later-added Bill of Rights.
B. Contextualizing the Text
Unlike other rights delineated by the Bill of Rights, the Petition Clause
generated very little debate during drafting and ratification. Some have
ascribed this omission to the petition process’s being so ubiquitous and so
mundane in the colonies by the time of the Founding that capturing the right
required little discussion—most state constitutions had included the right as a
matter of course, and the petition process and the purpose that it served were
largely taken for granted. The most substantive discussion of the right to
petition came in response to an effort to amend what would become the First
Amendment to include a more restrictive right—the right to instruct
representatives. It was through the rejection of this more restrictive right that
the Framers left us with a record of their interpretation of the right to petition.
The process of “instructing” representatives was what many at the
Founding, but especially the Federalists, viewed as an anachronistic mechanism
afforded the state governments in the Confederation Congress. Unlike
petitions, instructions emanated from majorities and official institutions only.
In the Confederation Congress, instruction allowed state governments,
constituted by a majority, to bind a lawmaker to a particular course of action.93
If a lawmaker failed to abide by the instructions that directed him, he risked
recall back to his state and loss of salary.94 The mechanism of instruction in the
Confederation Congress was itself a carryover from the colonial governments
and had been used increasingly in the colonies as the primary means of political

90. Id. at 2201-02.
91. See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the

Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1463 (1998); Alison G. Olson,
Eighteenth-Century Legislatures and Their Constituents, 79 J. AM. HIST. 543, 556-57 (1992);
Alan Tully, Constituent-Representative Relationships in Early America : The Case of PreRevolutionary Pennsylvania, 11 CAN. J. HIST. 139, 143-45 (1976).
92. Higginson, supra note 34, at 153.
93. See John P. Kaminski, From Impotence to Omnipotence : The Debate over Structuring
Congress Under the New Federal Constitution of 1787, in HOUSE AND SENATE, supra note 21,
at 1, 25-26.
94. Id.
1
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engagement.95 Instructions embodied a rejection of the British conception of
“virtual representation”—the notion that each member of Parliament
represented the whole people and not the particular locality that elected him.96
It was via virtual representation, Britain argued, that the colonies were
represented in the House of Commons despite not possessing the franchise.97
The colonies rejected virtual representation for what they termed “actual
representation” by colonial governments and moved from petitioning to
instructing their assemblies to declare independence from Britain.98 As Gordon
Wood described it,
[T]he petitioning and the instructing of representatives were rapidly becoming
symbols of two quite different attitudes toward representation . . . . Petitioning
implied that the representative was a superior so completely possessed of the full
authority of all the people that he must be solicited, never commanded, by his
particular electors . . . . Instructing, on the other hand, implied that the delegate
represented no one but the people who elected him and that he was simply a
mistrusted agent of his electors, bound to follow their directions.99

Modern legislation scholarship refers to these two models of representation by
the roughly analogous contemporary theories of trustee and agency,
respectively.100
Despite early enthusiasm for actual representation around the time of the
Revolution, support of instructing as the ideal means of engaging with
government outside of the vote would soon wane.101 Relying heavily on
instructions had its costs, and governance in the colonies grew more
decentralized and more fractured.102 Localities leaned heavily on instructions
in binding general governments to the needs of their constituencies and, given
the inevitable blurring between local and general issues, instructions
contributed to converting the public into an “infinite number of jarring,
disunited factions.”103 As Wood observed, the era preceding the Founding saw
a similar decline in the version of republicanism reliant on virtue and on

95. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 189-90

(1969).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 176.
98. Id. at 189.
99. Id.
100. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 123-24 (1995).
101. WOOD, supra note 95, at 195-96; see also id. at 606-15 (describing the transition in
American’s conception of politics from an expectation of virtuous homogeneity to an
acknowledgement of diverse pluralism).
102. Id. at 192-93.
103. Id. at 192.
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transcendence of self-interest in the domain of lawmaking.104 With the
factions wrought by actual representation, instructions, and other structures of
direct democracy, the Founding generation witnessed first-hand the realities of
human nature on which they had to construct the American republic.
Madison framed this paradigm shift from American homogeneity and
virtuous republican exceptionalism to the realities of pluralist politics in poetic
terms in The Federalist No. 10 : “Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an
aliment without which it instantly expires.”105 Rather than force human
nature into the Aristotelian virtue ethics required by antiquated republican
forms of government, the constitutional experiment of 1787 would recognize
the intrinsic nature of factions and the expansive range of the public good in
order to design around these democratic “defects.”106 As Madison theorized in
The Federalist No. 10, America could not plausibly vanquish liberty, nor could it
enforce or expect a homogeneous vision of the good, and it was under these
conditions that factions flourish.107 The aim of government was not to control
the causes of faction; in Madison’s view, the aim of government was instead to
control the effects of faction and to construct mechanisms to prevent
competing visions of the good from debilitating the newly formed national
government. The Framing generation would realize this goal through what
Madison termed the “republican principle,” or the scheme of representative
government.108 Through representative democracy, rather than a “pure” or
direct democracy, government would control faction by passing public views
“through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.”109 By passing the public
will through the filter of republican government, in Madison’s vision, “it may
well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the
people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the
people themselves.”110 So it was that the Framing generation reflected on the
failures of actual representation and, in rejecting the latter, embraced a new
form of republicanism that rejected instructions.
The debate over whether representation in the new Congress should
subscribe to the theory of representation aligned with instructions or one
aligned with petitioning surfaced in the House of Representatives debates
around drafting what would become the First Amendment. On Saturday,
August 15, 1789, following debate over other proposed amendments, the House
considered the text of the nascent Petition Clause: “The freedom of speech and
1

104. See id. at 195.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 44 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1

106. See id. at 44-46.
107. Id. at 44-45.
108. Id. at 45, 47-48.
109. Id. at 46-47.
110. Id. at 47.
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of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for
their common good, and to apply to the Government for redress of grievances,
shall not be infringed.”111 Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts spoke first and,
finding the right to assemble—the necessary predicate to speaking in an era of
low-tech communications—redundant to the right of speech, moved to strike
the phrase “assemble and.”112 If the Constitution was to include such an obvious
and duplicative right, Sedgwick declared, it must also declare “that a man
should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he
pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper.”113
Striking out “assemble and” concerned Thomas Tudor Tucker of South
Carolina because the phrase had been recommended by the states of Virginia
and North Carolina.114 The recommendations of these particular southern
states, Tucker lamented, had been largely neglected. He noted that the proposed
amendment omitted Virginia and North Carolina’s most “material” proposal:
the right to instruct their representatives.115 In light of the fact that Virginia
and North Carolina might soon lose ground on the right to assemble, Tucker
stated his intention to move to include the right of instruction following
resolution of the motion to strike the right to assemble.116
As the text of the Constitution reveals, the right to assemble survived the
motion. The House then refocused its institutional attention on Tucker’s
amendment, which would prove far more contentious than omission of the
mere “surplusage” that was the right to assemble. At the very moment Tucker
moved to insert the words “to instruct their Representatives,” Thomas Hartley
of Pennsylvania exclaimed aloud that he “wished the motion had not been
made.”117 Hartley’s concern was that the proposal had reinvigorated the
longstanding debate over actual and virtual representation embodied in the
distinct recognition of petitioning rather than instructions.118 Representation
in Congress, according to Hartley, required that the people have trust in their
representatives to govern independently. The principle of representation was
“distinct from an agency, which may require written instructions.”119
A majority of the House shared Hartley’s concerns with instructions as a
“dangerous doctrine, subversive of the great end for which the United States
have confederated,” which could prove “utterly destructive of all ideas of an
111. 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1089 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
112. Id. at 1089-90.
113. Id. at 1090.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1091.
118. Id. at 1091-92.
119. Id. at 1092.
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independent and deliberative body.”120 By allowing the right to instruct, “the
Government would be altered from a representative one to a democracy,
wherein all laws are made immediately by the voice of the people.”121 Such a
right might leave the legislature open to capture by the “passions” of people,
echoing Madison’s term for faction.122 The new legislature was expected to do
more than simply reflect the public will. The Constitution would instead
include a variety of checks on representation elsewhere—bicameralism for
example—that would foster structured deliberation and an ordered lawmaking
process in Congress.123 In order to prevent disruption of these mechanisms, the
“right of the people to consult for the common good can go no further than to
petition the Legislature, or apply for a redress of grievances.”124
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts espoused the minority view that the right
to instruct was a necessary additional check on the inevitable
maladministration of government.125 Gerry interjected that instruction would
no more foster faction in the House than would deliberation.126 Moreover, the
right to instruct was a fundamental component of sovereignty, according to
Gerry, and to fail to recognize the right to instruct would cause the people to
relinquish the sovereignty vested in them elsewhere in the Constitution.127 But
Gerry couched his support for instructions on the theory that the instructions
would serve to advise only and would not bind representatives to the will of
constituent majorities.128 He also balked at the criticism of the majority that
instructions would serve to convert the new national government into a
democracy.129 Holding himself as among the Anti-Federalists, Gerry wholly
expected the new government to be a democracy, just not a direct
democracy.130 John Page of Virginia shared this view as well, seeing
representative democracy as a necessary evil to resolve problems of scale and
geography—were it possible for all to cast a vote, in Page’s view the
government must allow it.131

120. Id. at 1093, 1105.
121. Id. at 1097.
122. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 ( James Madison), supra note 105, at 43-44.
1

123. 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 1094.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1094-96.
126. Id. at 1095.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1095-96.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1101-02.

1151

Lobbying and the Petition Clause
68 STAN L. REV. 1131 (2016)

The majority view prevailed, declining the proposed amendment and
rejecting the right to instruction by a vote of forty-one to ten.132 In the
majority view, it was petitioning that ought to form the limiting principle on
how the public could engage in the lawmaking process outside of the vote, in
order to maintain republican principles and those mechanisms of
representation carefully designed and detailed elsewhere in the Constitution.
To provide the right to instruct was to require members to be bound by those
instructions, thereby disrupting the deliberative and independent lawmaking
process envisioned by Article I. The right to petition, by contrast, very clearly
did not bind, yet it afforded the public a formal and transparent channel by
which the public could “declare their sentiment . . . to the whole body.”133
While the legislative history might convey the Founders’ personal views
in framing the Petition Clause, there is little better evidence of the public’s
understanding of the Petition Clause than the Framing generation’s exercise of
the right before and after ratification—it wasted no time in doing so. Amidst
the debates in the House and Senate over the proposed amendments, including
the Petition Clause, Congress was affording equal, formal, and public process to
petitioners. Historians have documented over six hundred petitions to the First
Congress.134 Notably, petitioners of the First Congress did not limit themselves
to matters of private concern. To provide a few examples, petitions conveyed
grievances pertaining to a range of matters, including regulation of commerce,
the need for public credit, the institution of slavery, requests for intellectual
property protection, disposition of public lands, public employment and
elections, the location of postal offices and federal courts, and the settlement of
war debts and pensions.135 Congress most often referred these petitions to the
executive or to a congressional committee for review and routinely provided
each a formal response.136 Not infrequently, petitions included argument,
charts, maps, and proposed statutory language.137
The unenfranchised, including one Mary Katherine Goddard of Maryland,
also petitioned the First Congress on their own behalf.138 Goddard had recently

132. Id. at 1105.
133. Id. at 1096.
134. William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances : A View from the First
1

135.
136.

137.

Federal Congress, in HOUSE AND SENATE, supra note 21, at 29, 31.
Id. at 31-56.
See STAMM OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 7,
1789 TO DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 361 (Comm. Print 1986).
diGiacomantonio, supra note 134, at 46; see also Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the
People : Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2011).
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 232-33 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
1

138.
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been dismissed as postmistress for the city of Baltimore after serving in the
position for over fourteen years and petitioned Congress to challenge the
dismissal.139 Goddard argued that at the time, the Washington Administration
mandated that only “manifest misconduct” would establish a basis for dismissal
from public office.140 It was unclear whether Goddard’s dismissal was due to
gender—her replacement appointee was male—or her close association with
the Anti-Federalists through her brother, William.141 In addition to contacting
President Washington directly, Goddard submitted Washington’s executive
order, along with her petition signed by two hundred Baltimore businessmen,
to the Senate for consideration.142 The Senate read her petition but declined to
act in her favor.143 Again, it was unclear whether the refusal was driven by
discrimination or politics, but the petition was accepted like all others.144 The
petitions of the unenfranchised also included the petition of Jehoiakim
McToksin, citizen of the Stockbridge, or Moheconnuck, Nation, who
petitioned for compensation due to him for serving as an interpreter for the
United States in the war for independence.145 Presented by the representative
for Massachusetts, who also collected affidavits on McToksin’s behalf, the
petition was successful, and Congress granted McToksin his unpaid salary and
forgave his missing documentation.146
139. Richard R. John & Christopher J. Young, Rites of Passage : Postal Petitioning as a Tool of
1

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Governance in the Age of Federalism, in HOUSE AND SENATE, supra note 21, at 100, 109-10.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 138, at 231-33.
John & Young, supra note 139, at 114.
Id.
diGiacomantonio, supra note 134, at 52; see also H.R. JOURNAL, 1st. Cong., 1st Sess. 804
(1789) (noting a resolution “directing the payment of $120” to McToksin).
diGiacomantonio, supra note 134, at 52. Absent from this history of petitioning is
discussion of the so-called “gag rules,” a series of resolutions passed by the House during
the 1830s and 1840s to limit consideration of petitions on the subject of slavery. See
Higginson, supra note 34, at 158-65. Omission of this later history of petitioning is not
inadvertent. Rather, it is pragmatic. The secondary sources describing nineteenthcentury petitioning lend primacy to assorted debates around the gag rules largely based
on the false premise that the gag rules caused the end of petitioning in Congress. Id. at
143 (“Although sheer volume of business eventually might have severed the duty of
assembly consideration from First Amendment petitioning, this result was guaranteed
when petitioning became enmeshed in the slavery controversy.” (footnote omitted));
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 34, at 751 (“The so-called gag rule, which prohibited
receipt of petitions concerning slavery, brought this era of petitioning to an end.”).
More recent scholarship has discredited this earlier theory, most notably a thorough
treatment of the question by legal historian Tabatha Abu El-Haj in her pathbreaking
work on nineteenth-century state and local political participation outside of the vote.
See Abu El-Haj, supra note 137, at 28-35. A comprehensive treatment of nineteenth and
twentieth-century congressional petitioning has yet to be written, however. I aim to
address this notable absence in future projects.

1153

Lobbying and the Petition Clause
68 STAN L. REV. 1131 (2016)

C. Contextualizing Lobbying
A comprehensive history of lobbying, charting its course across the
development of the American republic, has yet to be written. To the extent
that the historiography of American politics references lobbying at all,
historians have largely cabined their study to particular eras, interest groups,
and legislative vehicles.147 Aside from the descriptive work of public choice
theory, lobbying has been largely absent from political theory and political
ethics. Political scientists have created out of whole cloth the assumption that
“[l]obbying is probably as old as government,” with little development of the
basis for that assumption.148 Even the origin of the term “lobbying” remains in
dispute.149 It is as if the amorphous nature of lobbying has seeped into the very
scholarship that surrounds it.
Despite the invisibility of what some refer to as the “fourth branch” of
government, the few Early Americanists to focus on lobbying describe the
practice as wholly distinct from petitioning.150 Political historian Jeffrey
Pasley describes lobbying as “the personal buttonholing of lawmakers by paid
agents of special interests,” and earlier historical work of the period found little
evidence of our modern lobbying system in the First Congress.151 Much of the
pressure from interested groups during this period took the form of petitions,
private letters, and engagement with the press.152 While pressure groups
engaged in all of these tactics, the petition process constituted the primary
means by which individuals and loose associations engaged in the lawmaking
process.153 Pasley speculates that the absence of the comprehensive lobbying
scheme we have today was due, at least in part, to the efficient functioning of
petitioning.154 But, in contrast to earlier inquiry, Pasley’s review of the
historical documents of the First Congress revealed “abundant evidence” of a
different kind of lobbying, one of subtler and more limited form.155

147. See Pasley, supra note 21, at 57-58.
148. LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 12 (1963).
149. Compare Pasley, supra note 21, at 72 (tracing the term back to before 1808 as a way to

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

describe “upper-crust” citizens congregating in the antechambers of Congress), with
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX
TO CITIZENS UNITED 149-50 (2014) (tracing the term back to “the beginning of the
nineteenth century as paid influencers started to hang around the lobbies of legislative
buildings and hotels”).
Pasley, supra note 21, at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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Pasley describes this subtle and limited form of early lobbying as an
outgrowth of petitioning.156 It was common practice at the Founding to hire
lawyers to draft and deliver petitions on behalf of petitioners.157 The petition
process included a range of formalities, and attorneys could prove helpful in
navigating those formalities by drafting and presenting the documents.158
Lawyers largely stayed away from broader policy petitions, however, mainly
focusing their representation on petitions with individualized grievances.159
Convinced that it might increase their chances of favorable consideration,
some petitioners began to hire agents not only to draft and present their
petitions but also to contact members personally and monitor the
consideration process.160 While most petitioners or their agents delivered the
petition and then left the capital, many began to stay and to put up extended
residence around the seat of national government.161 Less politically connected
and distinguished agents frequented the hallways of Congress, as well as local
taverns, in the hopes of catching a member for casual conversation.162 Pasley
traces an early usage of the term “lobby” to describe loiterers in the
antechambers of Congress, where interested parties would congregate in hopes
that they might catch a moment with a member.163 While there was extensive
evidence of loitering in lobbies and bars,164 there is little evidence that such
loitering was ever actually successful.
One of the first comprehensive lobbying campaigns was waged by the
Quakers, a community that still prides itself today on its vigorous legislative
advocacy.165 The Quakers coupled their attempts to petition the First Congress
to abolish slavery with an impressive lobbying campaign that included
“looming” over the galleys, loitering in the lobbies to approach members as
they left formal proceedings, visiting members’ temporary capital lodgings,
and inviting members of Congress to discuss the issue over meals.166 Not
surprisingly, the Quakers’ aggressive methods cultivated an incredible hostility
by members against any and all forms of lobbying.167 The Quakers’ conduct

156. Id. at 61-62.
157. Id. at 62.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 64-65.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 63-64.
163. Id. at 72.
164. Id. at 64, 77.
165. See, e.g., History of FCNL, FRIENDS COMM. ON NAT’L LEGIS. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://fcnl.org

/about/history/chronology.
166. Pasley, supra note 21, at 64-65.
167. See id. at 65.
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was unprecedented. Very few organized interests existed in the capital at that
time, and none circumvented the petition process in ways similar to the
Quakers.168 Following the campaign, “Congress took steps to prevent a repeat
of the episode.”169
The rise of our modern, ubiquitous lobbying culture did not occur until
the mid- to late-nineteenth century.170 Some ascribe its development to
growing dysfunction within the petition process and petitioning’s slow
decline.171 Consideration of petitions became less formalized and Congress
implemented a series of rules that provided petitions less prominence on the
legislative agenda.172 While Congress undermined the petition process by a
thousand procedural cuts, lobbying flourished, as did the reality that the ability
to have a voice during the lawmaking process required hiring a lobbyist to
speak on your behalf.173 With the rise of lobbying came the use of ever more
creative practices of influencing the lawmaking process, including bribery and
other more nefarious means.174 Public proclamations of hatred for the
profession soon followed.175 Eventually, likely some time during the
Progressive Era, lobbying wholly supplanted petitioning as the primary means
of public engagement with the lawmaking process outside of the vote.176
II. The “Decontextualized” Petition Clause
A. Our Lobbying Regulatory Framework
There are few today who would defend our current lobbying system on
consequentialist grounds.177 Many, if not most, Americans hold lobbyists in
168. Id. at 65-66.
169. Id. at 66 (quoting 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 138, at 314).
170. Id. at 60-61.
171. See id.
172. See Higginson, supra note 34, at 159-65 (describing the gag rule debates in depth);

173.
174.
175.
176.

177.

Benjamin Schneer, Representation Replaced: How Congressional Petitions Substitute
for Direct Elections 13 (Sept. 12, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.dropbox
.com/s/ox9rwuo0cy7h3w6/ben_schneer_jmp.pdf?dl=0. But see Abu El-Haj, supra
note 137, at 32-35 (describing the impact of the gag rule as “overstate[d]”).
Pasley, supra note 21, at 61.
Id.
Id.
See Schneer, supra note 172, at 13-14. Because scholars are just beginning to speculate as
to these questions, the exact timing and causes of the formal petitioning process’s
demise in Congress are as of yet unknown. My future work in this area will begin to
address these questions.
Although few would defend our current lobbying system on consequentialist grounds,
one stalwart body of scholarship suggesting such a defense remains. According to some
public choice theorists, our lobbying system and preferential treatment of the
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incredibly low regard,178 lobbying is often referred to as “legalized bribery,”179
and the overwhelming majority of Americans believe that lobbyists routinely

politically powerful could result in efficient policy outcomes. Gary S. Becker, A Theory
of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 373 (1983);
cf. KEVIN M. ESTERLING, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXPERTISE: INFORMATION AND
EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS 1-2 (2004) (“[S]ociety should prefer to be
governed by expert-informed rather than ill-informed policies because the former are
often more effective and efficient in reaching social goals. . . . Unlike policy experts,
ordinary citizens often have at best a rudimentary or incomplete understanding . . . [of
the information] underlying an expert policy idea or proposal.”). Becker’s model
responded to a growing disapproval among public choice scholars over the
preferential treatment of politically powerful special interest groups and a concern
that preferential treatment of these groups would result in an inefficient expression of
majority preference. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 34 (1991); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 31-32, 52 (1965)
(modeling group behavior and concluding that “small groups will further their
common interests better than large groups”).
The answer to Becker’s empirical claim that our current lobbying system results in an
efficient expression of majority preference is that it is irrelevant here, where the
petition right protects the procedural rights of minorities regardless of legislative
outcomes. As Einer Elhauge argued persuasively, public choice theory necessarily rests
on an exogenous “normative baseline,” and most public choice scholarship assumes,
without support, that the correct normative baseline is majoritarianism. Einer R.
Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J.
31, 49-50 (1991); see also LARS UDEHN, THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC CHOICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS 10 (1996) (offering a sociological
critique of the economic theory of politics and describing the distinctions between
positive and normative public choice theory).
A contextualized understanding of the petition right offers an alternative normative
baseline for evaluating the lawmaking process—the equality of access and procedure
baseline supported by the right to petition—and provides grounds to reject the
majoritarian baseline assumed by public choice theory. Through the petition process,
Congress attended to and passed laws in favor of minorities and individuals, even, at
times, in contravention of the will of the majority. The requests of “specific interest”
groups were not only encouraged, they were officially sanctioned, regardless of their
comportment with majority preference. See Elhauge, supra, at 50.
178. In the first year that Gallup included lobbyists on its “honesty and ethics list,” lobbyists
debuted at the very bottom, immediately below automobile salesmen. Jeffrey M. Jones,
Lobbyists Debut at Bottom of Honesty and Ethics List, GALLUP (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/103123/lobbyists-debut-bottom-honesty-ethics-list.aspx.
In a different poll, respondents reported overwhelmingly, at 71%, that lobbyists held
too much power. Lydia Saad, Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks,
Feds, GALLUP (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/americans-decry
-power-lobbyists-corporations-banks-feds.aspx. A 2006 poll, around the time of the
Abramoff scandal, had 77% of respondents agreeing that lobbyists bribing members of
Congress is just “[t]he way things work in Congress.” CBS News & N.Y. Times,
Congress, the Abramoff Scandals, and the Alito Nomination 1 (2006), http://www
.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/JANB-CON.PDF.
179. Jeffrey Birnbaum, The End of Legal Bribery, WASH. MONTHLY ( June 2006), http://www
.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2006/0606.birnbaum.html.
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bribe members of Congress.180 Many decry lobbying as rent seeking and a
corruption of the democratic process.181 Despite near-unanimous consensus
that more must be done to regulate lobbying, Congress has enacted only
minimal and ineffective regulation in the face of lobbying scandals and
growing public concern. Some scholars, offering a more charitable
interpretation, have speculated that the discordant views of lobbying as both
criminal and constitutionally protected have evolved over time, resulting in a
jumbled patchwork of lobbying laws.182 Other scholars, more cynical of the
political process, see the corrupt handiwork of lobbyists themselves in failures
to regulate lobbying.183 Although public opinion seems quite settled about the
problem, Congress continues to raise concerns that any solution would violate
the Petition Clause. A close examination of the legislative histories of these
attempted reforms reveals that our inability to regulate lobbying is based, it
seems, on constitutional and not consequentialist or nefarious grounds.
Our often-criticized modern lobbying regulatory framework—namely
light-touch registration and disclosure regimes—has its origins in our ongoing
inability to reconcile lobbying with the Petition Clause. The legislative history
of this scheme provides an illustrative example of the underlying tensions
inherent in our efforts to regulate lobbying.
On April 4, 1935, then-Senator Hugo Lafayette Black of Alabama
introduced Bill 2512, titled “[t]o define lobbyists, to require registration of
lobbyists, and provide regulation thereof,” into the Senate.184 The main content
of that bill will feel familiar to anyone versed in our modern lobbying
regulation: it offered a registration requirement, a periodic disclosure regime,
and penalties for noncompliance. Black’s bill defined lobbying broadly,
regulating not only direct contact with legislatures but also indirect efforts to
influence legislation with advocacy campaigns aimed at the public. It defined
“lobbying” as an effort to influence any political branch, legislative and
executive, by any means possible—including direct means, like petitioning and
appearing before committees, as well as indirect means, like publishing books
or magazines.185 Next, the bill outlined a registration and disclosure scheme
that would require all who engaged in “lobbying” for compensation to register
with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate
180. Americans Taking Abramoff, Alito, and Domestic Spying in Stride, PEW RES. CTR. ( Jan. 11,
1

181.
182.
183.

184.
185.

2006), http://pewrsr.ch/X0KeSB (finding that 81% of Americans believed that
lobbyists bribing members of Congress was “common behavior”).
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 3, at 197-98.
See Briffault, supra note 3, at 193.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation : History Through 1954, in THE
LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE 5, 8
(William V. Luneburg et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).
S. 2512, 74th Cong. (1935).
Id. § 1.
1
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before engaging in any lobbying activity.186 The bill then required the
registrant to file monthly disclosure reports thereafter that included all income
received, names of individuals lobbied, and names of all publications authored
by the lobbyist.187 Failure to comply with the registration and disclosure
regimes carried a penalty of $5000, criminal sanctions of not more than twelve
months in prison, or both.188
By the time that Senator Black drafted his bill, the formal petition process
had fallen into disuse and the primary means of engagement with Congress
was through informal mass mobilization tactics.189 The structure of the bill
captured Senator Black’s view that petitioning encompassed the broad and
informal practice of public-directed advocacy and mass mobilization of his day,
including not only direct engagement with legislators but also the act of
advocating for or against legislation in the public sphere. According to Black,
this broad right to petition was sacrosanct, and regulation aimed at “lobbying”
was an effort to expose abuse of the petition process in order to preserve the
right to petition. Senator Black did not believe that the Constitution protected
the right to “lobby,” a term that to Black encompassed only “bad lobbying” or
abuse of the petition process. When it came to lobbying, the Senator did not
mince words:
There is no constitutional right to lobby. There is no right on the part of any
greedy or predatory interest to use money taken from the pockets of the citizen
to mislead him and thus enlist his aid in enabling the same greedy and predatory
interest to take still more money out of the pocket of the same unsuspecting
citizen. There is no constitutional right on the part of any sordid and powerful
group to present its views behind a mask concealing the identity of the group.
These money-maddened men behind the mask have no right to send their hired
men out into the streets, into the places of business, into the homes and into the
churches, to persuade or frighten citizens into giving blanket authority to have
their names signed to telegrams and letters, to be later manufactured by highpowered, high-priced publicity agents, and sent at company expense to the
citizens’ representatives in Washington, in such way and manner as to
deliberately deceive those representatives.190

At the time Senator Black introduced his bill, no regulatory scheme
governed lobbyists at the federal level. After the first thorough congressional
investigation of lobbying activities in 1913 and a few scandals that followed,
members began introducing a variety of bills, only to have them die in

186. Id. § 4.
187. Id. § 5.
188. Id. § 7.
189. See Abu El-Haj, supra note 137, at 34-35; Eskridge, supra note 183, at 8; Schneer, supra

note 172, at 13.
190. Senator Hugo L. Black, Lobby Investigation, Address on NBC (Aug. 8, 1935), in 1 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 762, 762 (1935).
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committee.191 Black’s bill was similarly responsive to scandal: in 1935, the year
that Black introduced his bill, Congress was fighting to pass the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, commonly known as the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.192
The Wheeler-Rayburn bill was typical of the “trust-busting” legislation
common to the New Deal era, and it proposed bringing private utilities under
government oversight for the first time.193 The utility companies were not
going to take the new restrictions lying down and mounted one of the fiercest
antilegislation campaigns that Congress had seen.194 Most notably, the utility
companies flooded Congress with over 250,000 telegrams opposing the bill, all
of them paid for by the utilities and most with signatures forged by utility
employees.195 Controversy surrounding the campaign fueled both a new
Senate investigatory committee, focused on “lobbying,” chaired by Senator
Black and also a bill that he authored.196
Like all of the earlier reform efforts, Black’s bill also stalled. Following an
amendment to expand the disclosure period to three months and to broaden
the definition of lobbyist to anyone who, for pay, attempted “to influence
legislation, or to prevent legislation,” the Black bill quickly passed the
Senate.197 However, it faced strong opposition in the House. William Eskridge,
subscribing to the cynical view, has speculated that the bill’s failure was a result
of a Senate bill dying in a lobbyist-controlled House.198 But the legislative
history reveals a more nuanced story, grounded in a fundamental disagreement
over the right to petition and the relationship between petitioning and
lobbying.
The legislative history reveals that the House Judiciary Committee stalled
Black’s bill in order to make way for a draft of its own.199 Like Black, the House
Committee believed that the right to petition was sacrosanct and encompassed
the mass mobilization politics of the day. But the House Committee saw no
daylight between Black’s distinction of petitioning and lobbying, because the
actual regulated conduct of “influencing or preventing legislation” looked
identical. By that time, there were no longer clear rules to govern petitioning
191. Eskridge, supra note 183, at 8.
192. Id.; see also Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (repealed

2005).
193. Eskridge, supra note 183, at 8.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Registration and Regulation of Lobbyists : Hearing on S. 2512 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
1

Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong. 1-2 (1935).
197. 79 CONG. REC. 8305-06 (1935).
198. Eskridge, supra note 183, at 8.
199. See H.R. REP. NO. 74-2214, at 1-3 (1936) (introducing the House Judiciary Committee’s
own bill in 1936 to encourage “a reasonable and proper regulation of lobbying
activities”).
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and therefore abuse of that process, what Black called “lobbying,” was
impossible to identify. Therefore, the House saw any forced registration or
disclosure regime focused on legislative advocacy efforts, good or bad, as
necessarily an infringement of that sacrosanct petitioning right.200 The House
Committee would allow some infringement of the right to petition because of
the need to balance that right against the informational interest of lawmakers.
But that infringement must be narrowly tailored.201
The bill was then referred to conference in order to reconcile the House
and Senate drafts.202 The conference committee reported out a broad bill,
expanding the registration regime to include lobbyists who target the
executive and expanding the disclosure regime to require monthly disclosure
reports. The broad conference bill met its expected fate in the House and was
defeated in a floor vote by a three-to-one margin. In the debates that preceded
the defeat, House members expressed concern that the broad bill regulated
beyond the recent “bad lobbyists,” the utility companies, and would burden
“good” groups who petitioned, such as “all farm organizations, all patriotic
organizations, all women’s clubs, all peace societies.”203 These floor debates
reveal that Black had argued convincingly for a normative distinction between
“good” petitioning and “bad” lobbying and that bad lobbyists, like the utilities,
had no petition rights to infringe. But House members struggled with the fact
that the conduct that constituted “petitioning” and “lobbying” looked identical.
Aside from penalizing those “bad lobbyists” directly, House members were not
convinced that there existed a way to regulate unprotected bad lobbying
without also regulating petitioning.204
It wasn’t until ten years later, after Black’s appointment to the Supreme
Court, that the text of the Black bill was revived, dusted off, and finally
muscled through both chambers on the coattails of comprehensive legislative
reform. Following World War II, the concern over associational lobbying
intensified, and in March of 1946, Congress established yet another special
committee—the Special Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress—to
investigate “any or all groups which have or are engaged in the present
propaganda campaign or lobby to defeat legislative measures for the relief of
the acute housing shortage . . . to abolish or weaken price control; [and] all

200. See id.
201. See id. at 1-2 (describing lobbying as protected by the right to petition and then

balancing that right against the informational interests of lawmakers, resulting in a
narrowed bill).
202. 80 CONG. REC. 9430 (1936).
203. Id. at 9747.
204. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 74-2925, at 1, 5-6 (1936) (documenting disagreements between the
House and the Senate about who should be regulated).
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groups which have or are engaged in the power lobby.”205 Five hurried months
later, President Truman signed into law the Legislative Reorganization Act,
Title III of which included the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.206 The
scheme closely tracked the language of the 1936 conference committee bill and
then-Senator Black’s bill, which had provided a basis for the committee bill.207
The legislative history reveals little attention to lobbying and confusion in the
floor debates over the effect of the legislation and its relationship with the
right to petition.208 Despite the confusion and lack of deliberation, the
momentum of the larger legislative reform bill would push the Lobbying Act
through. Although widely criticized as toothless and ineffective,209 Black’s
regime of registration and disclosure has served as the basis for all lobbying
regulation since 1946, replaced only by statutes that have adopted the same
registration and disclosure framework while strengthening requirements
around the edges.
B. Our Muddled Petition Clause Doctrine
A similar definitional muddle pervades our Petition Clause jurisprudence.
The First Amendment provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”210 Huddled at the end of this famous amendment is the nearly
forgotten Petition Clause. By comparison to other First Amendment
protections, the Supreme Court has only rarely turned its attention to this
particular piece of text. On those rare occasions where it has, the Court has
adopted a form of simple textualism uncommon to its First Amendment
jurisprudence211 and has abstained, perhaps out of necessity, from relying on
the historical context that so often provides an interpretive frame for its First

205. 92 CONG. REC. 2338 (1946) (introducing House Resolution 557, a resolution to establish

the special committee in the House); see also S. REP. NO. 1011, at 27 (1946).
206. Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. III, 60 Stat. 812, 839 (1946) (repealed 1995).
207. Compare id., with 80 CONG. REC. 9430-31 (1936), and S. 2512, 74th Cong. (1935).
208. 92 CONG. REC. 6552 (1946).
209. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FED. LOBBYING LAWS, supra note 31, at 6 n.53; Moshe Cohen-

Eliya & Yoav Hammer, Nontransparent Lobbying as a Democratic Failure, 2 WM. & MARY
POL’Y REV. 265, 286 (2011); Craig Holman, Disclosure Is Fine, but Genuine Lobbying Reform
Must Focus on Behavior, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2006, at 5, 5.
210. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
211. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (noting that First
Amendment analysis necessarily draws on contextual history of First Amendment
text and has “long eschewed any ‘narrow, literal conception’ of the Amendment’s
terms” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963))).
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Amendment jurisprudence.212 A review of the legislative history and doctrine
reveals that much of this simple textualism derives from the heavy
involvement of a single individual: famed textualist and First Amendment
absolutist Hugo Lafayette Black.
Justice Hugo Black is often referred to as the “patron saint” of modern
textualism.213 But among his lesser-known accomplishments is his role as the
patron saint of modern lobbying law. Black drafted the first comprehensive
scheme to regulate lobbying, a bill that provided the foundation for our
current lobbying regime,214 while serving as Senator for Alabama and drafted
the pillars of our Petition Clause doctrine215 after his appointment to the
Court.216 To each, Black applied his self-described “literalist”217 interpretative
method.
Following his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Black drafted
Noerr, the first case to address the right to petition in any depth, and a number
of other key cases in the Petition Clause constellation.218 In each, Black
brought his normative distinction between petitioning and lobbying and his
“literalist” interpretive method to bear on the Clause. Although Black described
his methodology as friendly to the incorporation of context and history in the
interpretation of text,219 at that time the history of petitioning was not before
the Court.220 Without an understanding of the history of the petition right,

212. We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers,

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

218.
219.
220.

J., concurring) (describing the Court’s regular reliance on history and rejection of a
“literalism” approach in interpreting the First Amendment and collecting cases).
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Bullets, Ballots, and Battles on the Roberts Court, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 445, 449 (2009).
See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-14 (2014).
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
See infra Part II.B.1.
Although Black and others have described Black’s early textualist method as “literalist,”
the term is a bit of a misnomer. The more accurate term would be “semantic-ist,”
denoting a narrow focus on the semantic meaning of text. Stephen C. Levinson,
PRAGMATICS 17-18 (2009) (describing the distinction as one between Grice’s speakermeaning and sentence-meaning, but also noting that the distinction is not always
clear). As contemporary legislation scholars, including John Manning, have identified,
the “literalist” textualists of the Progressive Era suffered from the inaccuracies of
interpreting text in the absence of context. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity
of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108-09 (2001). Modern textualists have remedied
these earlier interpretive missteps by incorporating an understanding of context as
defined by the field of pragmatics. Id.
See infra Part II.B.2.
HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 10 (1968).
See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 25-28, 28 n.21, Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (No. 50) 1960 WL
98829; see also We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 148-49 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., concurring) (noting that the Court had not yet tussled with the
historical argument in relation to the Petition Clause and speculating that the change
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Black turned to the text of the Petition Clause devoid of context and against a
background of changed circumstances. As is common for decontextualized
interpretations,221 the Court’s “literalist” interpretation of the Petition Clause
resulted first in an overinclusivity—for example, merely containing the term
“petition” or “grievance” brought practices within the purview of the doctrine,
and the Court expanded the petition right to include filing “petitions” in courts
and administrative agencies, the filing of “grievances” by public employees, and
any form of legislative advocacy.222
In the absence of this context, the Court has struggled to provide clear and
fixed meanings to the Petition Clause, often conflating practices historically
distinct but termed similarly in modern parlance. Eventually succumbing to
the lack of structure behind its Petition Clause analysis, thirty years ago the
Court effectively subsumed the right to petition under the more developed
doctrine of the Free Speech Clause.223 It was not until 2011, when faced with
this history, that the Court began to contextualize and clarify its Petition
Clause analysis in order to establish a distinct Petition Clause doctrine.224
Scholars have been quick to criticize this doctrinal muddle,225 but the
development of the doctrine in disparate substantive fields of law, from labor
to civil rights, has prevented the criticism from forming a chorus loud enough
to be heard. More importantly, the lack of intensive regulation and litigation
in the field of lobbying law and the development of the Petition Clause
doctrine between camps of legal scholarship has deterred a comprehensive

221.

222.

223.
224.
225.

in doctrine would prove drastic given the Court’s preference for reliance on history in
interpretation of the First Amendment).
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 41920 (1989). Although interpretive theory in this area is still ripe for future development,
Sunstein also begins to describe the interaction between literalism and changed
circumstances. Id. at 422-23.
See infra Part II.B.2. This process is referred to in linguistics as “word-sense
disambiguation,” or the ability of humans to discern from context the particular sense
of the meaning of the word used. Mark Stevenson & Yorick Wilks, Word-Sense
Disambiguation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 249, 249
(Ruslan Mitkov ed., 2003). As Stevenson and Wilks describe, the term light could
denote weight, as in “not heavy,” or “illumination.” Id. at 249.
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 485 (1985).
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011).
See, e.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 10 (2012); Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K : The “Difficult
Constitutional Question” of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS.
L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2003); John T. Delacourt, The FTC’s Noerr-Pennington Task Force :
Restoring Rationality to Petitioning Immunity, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 36, 36-37;
Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1177,
1177-79 (1992); William A. Herbert, The Chill of a Wintry Light? : Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri and the Right to Petition in Public Employment, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 617-22
(2012); Smith, supra note 34, at 1153.
1

1

1
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review of the Petition Clause doctrine. What follows is the beginning of a
broader review of the doctrine and an effort to highlight the incoherence
wrought on the right to petition through the lack of a contextualized
interpretation.
1.

Origins

Although the Supreme Court referenced the right to petition in dicta in
two nineteenth-century opinions—once as a predicate to the right to
associate226 and another as a predicate to the right to interstate travel227—the
Court’s first opportunity for substantive analysis of the right to petition came
in 1954. In an era of increasing political ferment, 1954 began the term that the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education228 and that the world’s leaders
convened in Geneva in efforts to bring peace in Vietnam. Also in that same
year, in United States v. Harriss, the Court reviewed a First Amendment
challenge to the statute born of Senator Black’s early handiwork and the first
statute to provide comprehensive regulation of lobbyists: the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946.229
The sections of the Lobbying Act at issue in Harriss, sections 305, 307, and
308, mandated registration requirements for all individuals and groups who
accepted money to influence “directly or indirectly” legislation in Congress and
required quarterly reporting of all moneys received and expended, as well as
the name of the legislation lobbied for or against.230 Application of the
Lobbying Act was broad and the statute purported to regulate
any person . . . who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other
persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or
receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the
principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the
following purposes:
(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United
States.
(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any
legislation by the Congress of the United States.231

The Lobbying Act also built on Black’s framework by adding the additional
penalty of a three-year lobbying ban for any violations of the registration and
disclosure requirements.232
226. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1876).
227. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 (1868).
228. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
229. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); see also Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. III, 60

Stat. 812, 839 (repealed 1995).
230. Id. at 614 n.1, 618-19.
231. Id. at 618-19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 266).
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Despite the victory celebrated by reformers following passage of the
Lobbying Act, the scheme suffered from serious flaws, not the least of which
was hurried, compromised drafting throughout the Act.233 In addition to
clumsy drafting errors, the Act was also structurally unsound and lacked an
enforcement mechanism outside of criminal penalties, which were presumably
enforceable by the Department of Justice.234 The Act’s disclosure requirements
were also unclear and treated contributions by lobbyists and contributions to
lobbyists as functionally identical expenditures.235 Not surprisingly, given the
questionable enforcement measures, very few prosecutions were brought
pursuant to the Lobbying Act, and it took eight years for a constitutional
challenge to come before the Court.236
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act,237
the United States challenged the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia’s dismissal of an information against a number of associational and
individual defendants.238 Relying on National Ass’n of Manufacturers v.
McGrath,239 the lower court had held the statute unconstitutional and dismissed
the ten-count information,240 which charged multiple violations of the
Lobbying Act.241 The government appealed.
In Harriss, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, reversed the
district court’s dismissal and upheld the Lobbying Act as constitutional. In
reaching this decision, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of four
provisions of the Lobbying Act on vagueness and First Amendment
grounds.242 Because Harriss is so uniformly presumed as the case where the
232. Id. at 626-27.
233. See id. at 631 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority was “rewrit[ing] the Act”

234.
235.

236.
237.
238.
239.

240.
241.
242.

by providing a limit on the definition of “lobbying” because the language used in the
Act was expansive and lacked any real limit).
See id. at 633-34 ( Jackson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 633 (“The Act passed by Congress would appear to apply to all persons who . . .
(2) receive and expend funds for the purpose of lobbying, or (3) merely expend funds
for the purpose of lobbying.”); see also Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, Pub.
L. No. 79-601, tit. III, 60 Stat. 812, 839 (repealed 1995).
Eskridge, supra note 183, at 12.
Act of March 2, 1907, .ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 613-17.
In National Ass’n of Manufacturers, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1952), a three-judge panel
struck down sections 303 through 307 of the Lobbying Act as unconstitutionally vague
in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and held section
310(b), the lobbying ban penalty, unconstitutional under the Free Speech and Petition
Clauses of the First Amendment. Id. at 514.
United States v. Harris, 109 F. Supp. 641, 641-42 (D.D.C. 1953), rev’d, 347 U.S. 612.
Brief for the United States, Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (No. 32), 1953 WL 79232, at *3, *22-23.
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 (“The ‘invalidity’ of the Lobbying Act is asserted on three
grounds: (1) that §§ 305, 307, and 308 are too vague and indefinite to meet the
1
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Supreme Court held definitively that Congress violates the Petition Clause by
banning or heavily regulating lobbying, including a notable recent misreading
by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC,243 it is worthwhile to explore
the case in depth to dispel this presumption.
The Court began in Harriss with a vagueness challenge. With respect to the
disclosure requirement, the Court avoided any accusations of vagueness by
interpreting the requirements to apply to paid lobbyists only.244 In analyzing
section 307, the definition of lobbying, the Court drew on United States v.
Rumely, a case that interpreted similar statutory language and legislative
history, to clarify that the Act applied to “lobbying in its commonly accepted
sense” only,245 that is, “to direct communication with members of Congress on
pending or proposed federal legislation.”246 Following this clarification of
section 307, the Court held that its narrowed construction rendered the
disclosure requirement sufficiently definite to survive constitutional
scrutiny.247
Turning next to the First Amendment, the Court addressed all clauses en
masse and held in a summary fashion that the disclosure and registration
requirements of the Lobbying Act, as construed, “d[id] not violate the freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment—freedom to speak, publish, and petition
the Government.”248 Its analysis was similarly general and held that the state
interest in providing lawmakers and the public information on who was
pressuring Congress and in “maintain[ing] the integrity of a basic
governmental process” outweighed any potential chilling effect on the exercise
of “First Amendment rights.”249 Although the Court did not specify the

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

requirements of due process; (2) that §§ 305 and 308 violate the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the right to petition the
Government; (3) that the penalty provision of § 310 (b) violates the right of the people
under the First Amendment to petition the Government.”).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 620 (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953)).
Id.
Id. at 622-24.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 625-26. Although the Court approached its First Amendment analysis without
specifying a particular clause, the balancing test applied by the Court bore a similarity
to a line of cases later termed the compelled-speech doctrine and, given the fact that
the Lobbying Act was a disclosure regime, the similarity should come as no surprise.
Originating in 1943 with West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the
compelled-speech doctrine held that the Free Speech Clause “includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943)
(Murphy, J., concurring). Similar to the reasoning in Harriss, the Court initially
identified the right as one generic to the “First Amendment,” without specifying a
particular clause. Id. at 642 (majority opinion). It was not until 1977 in Wooley v.
Maynard that the Court stated explicitly that the compelled-speech doctrine sourced
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particular clause on which its determination rested, its analysis resembled its
later compelled-speech doctrine developed to analyze similar disclosure
regimes.250
Finally, the Court addressed the challenge to section 310(b), the three-year
lobbying ban as a penalty for failing to comply with the registration and
disclosure requirements, as violative of the Petition Clause.251 The challenge to
section 310(b) on Petition Clause grounds presented the only clear right to
petition challenge against the only clear prohibition on petitioning and
lobbying activity in Harriss. The Court expressly declined to reach this issue.
Explaining that section 310(b) was a penalty and, therefore, had not yet been
applied to the defendants and might not ever apply if they were found
innocent, the Court found it “unnecessary to pass on [the] contention” whether
the lobbying ban in section 310(b) violated the Petition Clause.252 Contrary to
broad misconception, in reviewing the first comprehensive scheme regulating
lobbying and the last lobbying regulatory scheme to come before it, the Court
declined to address whether the Petition Clause prohibited Congress from
regulating lobbying.253
2.

Applying the clause to “lobbying”

To the extent that a law of public engagement with the lawmaking process
exists, Hugo Black had an influential hand in crafting it. Seven years after
Harriss, Justice Black spurred the development of what would become our
modern Petition Clause doctrine. This early doctrine also bore Black’s broad
conception of the right and his “literalist” interpretation of the Petition Clause.
In drafting Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,254
Justice Black addressed the meaning of the Petition Clause for the first time in
depth, introducing into the doctrine his literalist interpretation of the right to
petition as encompassing any form of advocacy aimed at influencing

250.

251.
252.
253.
254.

from the Free Speech Clause. See 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Later cases have followed suit
and have consistently analyzed disclosure regimes as affronts to the right of free
speech. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (noting a series of cases analyzing First
Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 366-67 (2010) (analyzing disclosure and disclaimer provisions under the
compelled-speech doctrine).
Compare Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-26 (upholding a disclosure regime on the grounds that
it provided information necessary for well-informed legislators and noting that the
regime did not prohibit speech), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67 (upholding a
disclosure regime on the grounds that it provided information necessary for a wellinformed electorate and noting that the regime did not prohibit speech).
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626-27.
Id. at 627.
Id.
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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government action, no matter the audience and no matter the form. Black’s
broad literalism, omitting all reference to the historical context that defined
the scope of the right, would set the stage for a series of cases that articulate the
petition right as it stands today.
In Noerr, the Court reviewed a gaggle of antitrust claims under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts that railroad and trucking operators had aimed at
one another in the midst of a freight war.255 The association for the trucking
industry had initiated the suit, alleging that the association for the railroad
industry had engaged in anticompetitive conduct with its publicity campaign
against the truckers.256 In particular, the truckers alleged that the railroads had
conducted a public directed-advocacy campaign, using the “third-party
technique,”257 whereby the railroad’s public relations firm would foster fake
“so-called ‘independent’ citizens groups” that would “circulate false and
malicious propaganda” that aimed to stop the passage of legislation favorable to
the truckers.258 While a few allegations alluded to contact with government
officials, the truckers’ complaint largely focused on anticompetitive conduct
directed at the public.259 Rather than anything analogous with the historical
petition right, the truckers’ complaint fell quite squarely into the domain of the
Free Speech Clause.
In fact, the railroads in Noerr argued the case under the anonymous speech
doctrine260 and attempted to distinguish United States v. Harriss and others like
it.261 These earlier cases had balanced protections for anonymous speech with
lawmakers’ strong informational interest in knowing the identity of the
speaker.262 Distinguishing these cases on the ground that they dealt with direct
participation in the lawmaking process, the railroads argued that this case was
aimed at influencing public discourse and, thus, attempts to speak anonymously
through “third-party” campaigns should incur heightened speech
protections.263 The Court was persuaded that the case raised First Amendment
concerns, but rather than relying on the Free Speech Clause and the
anonymous speech doctrine, the Court sua sponte analogized the railroads’
conduct to petitioning.264

255. See id. at 129-30.
256. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R.R. Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D.

Pa. 1953).
257. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 220, at 27.
258. Noerr, 113 F. Supp. at 741.
259. See id. at 741-42.
260. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 220, at 27.
261. Id. at *29-30.
262. See id. (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)).
263. See id. at 23, 29-30.
264. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961).
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Writing for the Court, Justice Black again invoked his understanding of
petitioning as a practice that spanned broadly to encompass any form of
legislative advocacy and communication, no matter the audience.265 As Justice
Black had known all too well from his days as a senator, “[i]n a representative
democracy such as this, these branches of government act on behalf of the
people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends
upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives.”266 To Black, who had served in the Senate after the formal
process of petitioning had fallen into disuse, any form of communication
directed at the public or otherwise regarding a legislative matter fell into the
category of petitioning.267 Accordingly, any interpretation of the Sherman Act
that might impede this fundamental mechanism of representation could not
accurately depict the intent behind the Act, Justice Black wrote, and had no
basis in its legislative history.268 It was only in the alternative that the Court
relied on the Petition Clause, citing potential constitutional questions with any
restriction the Act placed on “mere solicitation of governmental action with
respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”269
3.

Expanding the clause to courts and the executive

Over the next twenty years, applying the same literalist interpretation of
the petition right established in Noerr and in the absence of context around the
history and meaning of the right to petition, the Court expanded the petition
right to protect anything termed a “petition” filed in formal proceedings in the
judicial and executive branches.270 The Court began by bringing “petitions”
filed in courts under the protection of the Petition Clause. Then, relying on

265. See id. at 137-39.
266. Id. at 137.
267. Four years later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the Court revisited Noerr ’s
1

exception to the Sherman Act for legislative advocacy and squarely applied the
exception to conduct that more closely resembled petitioning—namely, direct
engagement with the Secretary of Labor. 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965).
268. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138-39.
269. Id. at 138. Some have called into question the extent to which Noerr rested its analysis
on Justice Black’s Petition Clause reasoning, rather than on a simple interpretation of
the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2502-03
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
270. A quick point of theoretical clarification: I am critical only of the grounds for the
Court’s expansion of the petition right to courts and the executive. A contextualized
reading of the Petition Clause could very likely support such an expansion, as the
petition process historically included an incredible amount of interbranch efforts at
petition resolution. The criticism of the doctrine in this Subpart focuses on the
reasoning on which the expansion is grounded and the “literalist” method employed,
which ignored the history and the nuances that history would bring to the doctrine.
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this doctrine, the Court further expanded the reach of Noerr-Pennington
antitrust immunity to judicial and executive “petitioning.”
Two years after Brown v. Board of Education and for the first time in almost
a hundred years, the state of Virginia amended certain professional ethics rules
governing client solicitation by lawyers.271 The amendment prohibited
solicitation of legal business by any “individual or organization which retains a
lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it
has no pecuniary right or liability.”272 As part of their efforts at integration, the
NAACP solicited the parents of Virginia school children to become clients and
then provided those parents with an attorney.273 Not coincidentally, this
amendment brought the litigation strategy implemented by the NAACP to
integrate southern schools squarely within the prohibitions of the ethics
rules.274 The NAACP challenged the rules in state court primarily on
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection grounds, but the
Virginia courts upheld the laws.275 The NAACP then petitioned for certiorari,
and the Supreme Court reversed.276
In what was likely a surprising move, the Court declined to adopt the
NAACP’s primary argument: that the rules offended notions of due process and
equal protection and, therefore, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.277 Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, relied instead on the NAACP’s alternative
grounds and struck down the ethics rules as violative of the First
Amendment.278 Echoing the approach taken in Harriss, the Court addressed the
First Amendment en masse, conflating the rights to speak, associate, and
petition under a conjoined right that the Court referred to as a right to
“vigorous advocacy.”279 The First Amendment, the Court held, protected
“vigorous advocacy” against government regulation because it constituted a
form of political expression.280 The Court reasoned that political expression in
the form of filing petitions in court was essential for minorities who would
“find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot” and
where “under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of

271. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423 (1963).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 421.
274. Id. at 423-26.
275. Id. at 424-26, 428 n.10.
276. Id. at 417-18, 428.
277. Id. at 428.
278. Id. at 428-29.
279. See id. at 429.
280. Id.
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grievances.”281 Among other purely associational rights, the Court also relied
on Noerr for the principle that disruption of organized legislative advocacy
could raise important “First Amendment” questions.282 Later opinions, drafted
by Justice Black, made clear that the right of access to courts rested firmly
within the specific protections of the Petition Clause.283
A few years after NAACP v. Button, the Court expanded the scope of the
Petition Clause again to include the “petitions” filed by prisoners pursuant to
the writ of habeas corpus.284 Justice Fortas wrote for the Court in Johnson v.
Avery and struck down a Tennessee statute prohibiting prisoners from
assisting other prisoners with habeas corpus petitions.285 The state of
Tennessee, finding the quality of habeas petitions falling rapidly in the hands
of untrained “jailhouse lawyers”—prisoners turned professional petition
writers—had decided to ban the practice.286 In striking down the law, the Court
held that the ban, in the absence of the prison offering any alternative,
effectively barred uneducated and illiterate prisoners from exercising the
“right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus”287—a right the
Court later clarified derived from the Petition Clause.
Finally, just a few months after Justice Black retired from the bench, the
Court took what it saw as the next natural step under Johnson and expanded the
Noerr-Pennington “lobbying” exception to reach advocacy directed at the courts
and the executive.288 “Certainly,” Justice Douglas wrote in reliance on Johnson,
“the right to petition extends to all departments of Government. The right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition.”289 Belying
this expansive interpretation, the facts of California Motor Transport Co.
challenged the Court’s earlier absolute petition right. Rather than a simple
antitrust claim involving allegations of judicial and administrative actions, the
association in California Motor Transport Co. alleged that a competitor had
initiated a flood of judicial and administrative actions as a means to crowd out

281. Id. at 429-30.
282. Id. at 430.
283. United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (holding that

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

the right to petition protects unions’ ability to provide staff counsel to represent
membership in workers’ compensation claims and that the petition need not be solely
for political purposes); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S.
1, 7 (1964) (holding that the union members’ ability to recommend lawyers to one
another for litigation is protected by the Petition Clause because the right to petition
the courts cannot be so handicapped).
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
Id. at 484, 490.
See id. at 484-88.
Id. at 486-87 (quoting Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941)).
See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
Id.
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and undermine the associations’ own pending actions.290 The competitor was
functionally engaging with the courts and agencies as an advocate, but the
alleged purpose of the actions was to blockade the court and agencies from the
advocacy of others.291
Black’s literalist right to petition from Noerr that promised unfettered
access to formal government institutions began to call out for a limiting
principle.292 Unlike the marketplace of ideas for speech, access to these
institutions was a finite resource, and the right to petition could not mean
absolute access that disrupted the functioning of government and foreclosed
the access of others.293 That the conduct was unethical, however, would not
provide the limit. Noerr had confronted a large-scale public relations campaign
where the railroad industry had organized fake advocacy associations and
engaged in “third party technique” campaigns under the identities of wellknown and well-compensated experts, but the Court had still shielded the
conduct from the antitrust laws.294 Later cases further emphasized that the
exception in Noerr applied to any “concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose.”295
Maneuvering carefully around these earlier exceptions, the Court seized
on some spare language in Noerr 296 and crafted what is known as the sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.297 Under this exception, the Court
declined to shield the association’s executive and judicial actions on the ground
that the actions were mere “shams”—i.e., not a “concerted effort to influence
public officials” but conduct aimed at blocking a competitor’s access to
government.298 The Court analogized the sham exception to abuse of
government process in many other contexts—for example, obtaining a patent
through fraud to block a competitor or bribing a government official.299
Contrary to Noerr ’s broad right to petition that shielded advocacy through
formal process, the sham exception allowed liability for advocacy that had a
1

1

290. Id. at 509, 511.
291. Id. at 512.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 515.
294. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140 (1961).
295. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (emphasis added).
296. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (“There may be situations in which a publicity campaign,

ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified.”).
297. Cal. Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 511.
298. Id. at 515-16.
299. Id. at 512-13.
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tendency to “corrupt the administrative or judicial processes.”300 The sham
exception has failed to provide much of a limit. Most notably and with some
irony, lower courts have declined to apply the sham exception to the context
from which it derived in Noerr—that is, legislative petitioning—because
abandonment of the formal petition process has left the courts without a
baseline against which to gauge improper advocacy.301 To the Court, our
lobbying system of today in Congress is seen as “no holds barred.”
4.

Conflating the clause into speech

Engagement with government outside of the formal processes offered by
litigation and administrative actions presented the Court with an even greater
challenge. Black himself struggled to draw this fine distinction. As a former
legislator who had served during a period where formal petitioning had
receded from view, Black’s decontextualized understanding of petitioning
defined petitioning so broadly as to include any form of advocacy that
addressed legislation. Also, as an absolutist, Black eschewed a First Amendment
doctrine that balanced the limitation of a First Amendment right against any
government interest, including the continued functioning of government.302
These two views presented particular challenges in the context of petitioning.
In contrast to speech directed at an open marketplace, petitioning addressed
direct engagement with government, which could require affirmative
government action and had the potential to wholly disrupt government
functioning. There are meaningful differences between limiting government
interference with a political speech in a park and requiring the government by
constitutional fiat to allow the same speech on the floor of Congress or inside a
prison, but the Petition Clause doctrine failed to provide the Court the tools to
manage these differences.
The Court had begun to establish some limits on the petition right with
respect to formal litigation and agency actions, but outside of those formal
processes and without the history to guide it, there was little to assist the Court
in limiting the right. Had the Court looked to the history, as the Court had
with its speech doctrine, it might have provided some formal limits to the
petition right. But the history was not before the Court. Given the overlap
between the broad petition right and free speech, the Court began to look for
300. Id. at 513.
301. See, e.g., Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“The sham exception is more easily applied to litigation, however, than it is to
lobbying before executive or legislative bodies.”); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶ 204, at 262 (2015).
302. HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 188-89 (1996); NOAH FELDMAN,
SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 143
(2010); JAMES J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT 5 (1980).
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limits within the fully developed speech doctrine, eventually conflating the
two clauses.303
The doctrine of protest was an area in which the Court, including in
opinions drafted by Black, began to conflate petitioning and speech early on
and so it bears particular mention. In the early 1960s, at the height of the civil
rights movement, law enforcement officers arrested over 150 AfricanAmerican students for entering and protesting on the South Carolina state
legislature’s grounds in alleged breach of the peace.304 The students met at a
nearby church and walked together to the grounds in order to protest. The
purpose of this protest, as described by the students, was
to submit a protest to the citizens of South Carolina, along with the Legislative
Bodies of South Carolina, our feelings and dissatisfaction with the present
condition of discriminatory actions against Negroes, in general, and to let them
know that we were dissatisfied and that we would like for the laws which
prohibited Negro privileges in this State to be removed.305

The students challenged their convictions on First Amendment grounds and,
in Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court held that the students had exercised
their First Amendment rights “in their most pristine and classic form.”306
Although the Court did not specify explicitly that it rested its decision on the
Petition Clause, it described the protest as a peaceable assembly whereby the
students “expressed their grievances ‘to the citizens of South Carolina, along
with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina.’”307 In striking down the
convictions as violative of the students’ “First Amendment freedoms,” the
Court noted especially that the legislature was located on the grounds of the
protest and was in session on that day.308
Later cases struggled, however, to maintain the distinct doctrine of protest
as petition, rather than speech. Just a few years after the Court’s ruling in
Edwards, the Court faced a nearly identical set of facts in Adderley v. Florida.309
On an afternoon in Florida, approximately 200 students walked from their
nearby school to the local jail in order to protest the jail’s discriminatory policy
of segregation and the recent arrest of their classmates following another
protest.310 When a number of students declined to leave the jail premises upon

303. The Court has heard a number of cases that could have been petition cases but were

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

treated as speech. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230 (1963).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 235 & n.10.
385 U.S. 39, 40 (1966).
Id. at 44-45.
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request by custodians of the jail, the police arrested the students for trespass. 311
Justice Black, writing for the Court, unexpectedly upheld the convictions.
Without mention of his expansive petition right, Black distinguished Edwards
and upheld the law on speech principles, invoking reasoning that sounded in
the public forum doctrine familiar to free speech.312 Unlike the capitol
grounds, Black reasoned, the jail had not been traditionally open to the
public.313 Moreover, the students had entered the jail through a driveway not
open to public traffic and “without warning to or permission from the
sheriff.”314
The dissent took issue with Black’s framing of the case as dealing simply
with speech.315 As an outgrowth of the executive, the jail, the dissent argued,
was as much a branch of government as the courts and legislatures, and the
Court had defined a broad petition right under NAACP v. Button that spanned
across all three branches.316 Given the Court’s earlier holdings, whether the jail
had been open to the public was immaterial in the dissent’s view to analysis of
the case under the Petition Clause and was even less important in cases
addressing the rights of minorities where the “[c]onventional methods of
petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large groups of our
citizens.”317 The dissent argued vigorously that the students had not disrupted
the jail, nor had the students obstructed the entrances to the jail, and they had
moved upon request.318 But a limitless petition right that allowed groups to
enter government property, even prisons, at any time and without notice was
too much for the Court—and even Justice Black—to bear. Out of necessity, the
Court began to back away from its Petition Clause doctrine.
The Court’s steady project of conflating the Free Speech and Petition
Clauses finally came to a conclusion in a pair of cases brought before the Court
in the mid-1980s.319 In the first, Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v.
Knight, the Court reviewed a challenge brought by community college
instructors against a Minnesota statute that assigned the instructors a
representative with whom the state college would “meet and confer” over
college administrative matters and employment terms for the faculty.320 The

311. Id. at 40.
312. Id. at 41.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 48-50 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 49-51.
317. Id. at 50.
318. Id. at 51-52.
319. For an additional case that ignored the speech-petition distinction, see Regan v.

Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
320. 465 U.S. 271, 273-75 (1984).
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instructors took issue with the statute because it prevented anyone aside from
the assigned representative from attending and participating in the meet-andconfer sessions. That the college refused to “meet and confer” with them over
college administrative policy and employment terms, the instructors alleged,
violated their First Amendment rights. Justice O’Connor, writing for the
Court, upheld the law and, without citation to any earlier cases developing the
broad petition right, stated in sweeping terms that “[n]othing in the First
Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights
to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or
respond to individuals’ communications on public issues.”321 The Court framed
the instructors’ argument as one radically more broad than a simple request for
access to a public forum. Rather, the Court saw in the instructors’ case an effort
to create a constitutional right out of whole cloth that would afford individuals
a “right to participate directly in government” and would require all branches
of government “to afford every interested member of the public an
opportunity to present testimony before any policy is adopted.”322
Such a right, the Court reasoned, “would work a revolution in existing
government practices,” raise concerns of federalism and separation of powers,
and transform our republican form of government into a direct democracy.323
Nowhere in the opinion does the Court reference the history of the petition
process, and later courts have noted that the history was not before the Court
at that time.324 Confronted with a request for an expansive petition right
devoid of any limiting principle that the history of the Petition Clause could
provide, the Court was unable to envision a more limited form of formal
public engagement with the lawmaking process. Consequently, the Court may
have stripped the petition right of one of its core distinctive characteristics—
that is, the right to formal consideration and response—and conflated
implicitly the right to petition and the speech right.
The Court issued the opinion generally recognized as conflating explicitly
the Free Speech and Petition Clauses a few months later.325 In McDonald v.
Smith, the Court again reviewed a narrow question: whether immunity from
libel extended to letters sent to the President.326 The letters’ aim was to disrupt
the appointment process for a potential U.S. Attorney whom the letter accused

321. Id. at 285.
322. Id. at 284.
323. Id.
324. We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers,

J., concurring).
325. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 225, at 157; see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610

n.11 (1985) (“Although the right to petition and the right to free speech are separate
guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional analysis.”).
326. 472 U.S. 479, 480 (1985).
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of fraud and other ethical violations.327 The letters had their intended effect,
and the thwarted candidate commenced a libel action.328 The Court’s holding
was narrow: even assuming the letters were petitions, they were subject to the
libel laws.329 Despite this seemingly narrow holding, many read the Court’s
sweeping language in the opinion as the death knell for a distinctive Petition
Clause doctrine.330 In particular, the Court described the right to petition as
“cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment,”
and it held the right “inseparable” from the “freedoms to speak, publish, and
assemble.”331 In light of this inseparability, the Court held, “there is no sound
basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a
petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.”332
The Court’s conflation of petitioning and speech inspired a flurry of
scholarly commentary and criticism.333 In just a few years following the
Court’s ruling in McDonald, a number of scholars began to unearth the history
of petitioning in order to challenge the Court’s decontextualized view of the
Petition Clause.334 Two historical pieces, published just months after the Court
issued its decision in McDonald, provided a detailed history of petitioning at the
Founding and stretching back to medieval England and criticized the Court for
its failure to recognize the distinctive concerns at issue with the Petition
Clause.335 Many others soon followed, calling for a strengthened and
distinctive petition right rooted in an historical understanding of the Clause.336
5.

An historic revival

In 2011, the Court confronted the historical literature crafted postMcDonald for the first time in the context of a contentious employment dispute
between a chief of police and his small-town employer in Pennsylvania. In
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, Charles Guarnieri brought suit against his city
employer for retaliation, alleging violations of his Petition Clause rights.337
Guarnieri had initially brought a public employee grievance pursuant to his

327. Id. at 481.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 483.
330. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 717 n.431 (2002)
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

(reviewing the literature).
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482, 485.
Id. at 485.
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
Id.
See Smith, supra note 34, at 1153; Higginson, supra note 34.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
131 S. Ct. 2488, 2492 (2011).
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collective bargaining agreement, challenging his termination as chief of
police.338 In adjudicating the grievance, the arbitrator held that the city had
committed procedural errors in processing Guarnieri’s termination and
ordered Guarnieri reinstated.339 In processing the reinstatement, the city issued
Guarnieri a series of additional job requirements and restrictions, which
Guarnieri challenged as retaliatory in a subsequent employee grievance and a
§ 1983 action.340
The lower courts had recently split over whether the content of the
grievance must address a matter of public concern in order to obtain
protection under the Petition Clause.341 Following the Court’s conflation of the
Petition and Free Speech Clauses in McDonald, many courts of appeals had
begun to import the “public concern” doctrine from the Free Speech Clause,
which prohibited retaliation claims against public employers unless the speech
was a matter of public concern, into the Petition Clause doctrine of public
employee grievances.342 The Third Circuit in Guarnieri split the circuits by
declining to apply the public concern doctrine.343 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy recounted the long history of
petitioning from Magna Charta to the modern day and emphasized the
importance of history in interpreting the Petition Clause as wholly distinct
from the right to free speech.344 Kennedy clarified that, contrary to broad
misconception, the Court had not conflated the Free Speech and Petition
Clauses in McDonald and that the rights aimed at distinct democratic functions:
“The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns
to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to
speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative
democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs.”345 Belying
these distinctions, however, Kennedy went on to apply the public concern
doctrine to Guarnieri’s grievance.346 The Court’s reasons were pragmatic: to
raise every employment dispute to a matter of constitutional significance
would result in an inadministrable standard.347 The same concerns that
motivated the public concern doctrine in the context of speech were equally
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 2493.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 2499.
345. Id. at 2495.
346. Id. at 2501.
347. Id.
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presented by employee grievances—namely, that the government needs a
limiting principle to allow for less disruption to government operations by
employee disputes—and allowing a different standard in the context of
grievances could allow easy circumvention of the speech rule.348 If every public
employee grievance was a petition protected by the Petition Clause, as the
Court assumed it had earlier held, this left the Court with no limiting principle
in order to protect the efficient functioning of government from the flood of
potential litigation.349 The Court acknowledged the history and established a
distinct Petition Clause doctrine, but it saw the public concern doctrine as a
necessary limiting principle.
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia were quick to criticize the Court’s
inconsistent application of the history.350 Justice Scalia rightly observed that
one of the primary functions of petitioning was the resolution of private
concerns.351 As his concurrence described, the “overwhelming majority of First
Congress petitions presented private claims.”352 Not only did the protections of
the Petition and Free Speech Clauses reside in separate texts in the
Constitution, the clauses also served wholly different values.353 Justice Scalia
agreed that the Court would require a limiting principle, but he disagreed that
transplanting the public-private distinction at the core of the First
Amendment’s marketplace-of-ideas values made any sense in the context of
other constitutional protections.354 It would likewise make little sense to say
that the exercise of religion in public ought to be a matter of greater
constitutional concern than practicing privately or to value due process
concerns for public interest litigation over cases adjudicating private
matters.355 Because the rights themselves are wholly different, the public
concern at the core of the Free Speech Clause simply has no place in the
context of the Petition Clause.356
Drawing heavily on the history, Justice Scalia offered instead two other
possible limiting principles, each of which bears particular mention here. First,
he questioned the Court’s presumption that it had earlier held public employee
grievances and lawsuits to be petitions subject to protection under the Petition

348. Id.
349. See id.
350. Id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring in

the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
351. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
352. Id. at 2504 (quoting 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 138, at xviii).
353. Id. at 2504-05.
354. Id. at 2506.
355. Id. at 2505.
356. Id.
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Clause.357 The Court’s doctrine establishing lawsuits as “petitions” rested on as
shaky ground as the lobbying doctrine; much of it was dicta or ambiguous
statutory interpretation with related Petition Clause concerns.358 Moreover,
looking to the history, Justice Scalia found little direct evidence that the
petition process ever engaged with courts.359 If neither Guarnieri’s grievance
nor his lawsuit obtained Petition Clause protection, Justice Scalia reasoned,
then there could be no corresponding suit for retaliation and the suit was
clearly limited.360 Alternatively, assuming that the Petition Clause protected
lawsuits and grievances, Justice Scalia offered a second alternative limiting
principle: the Petition Clause would protect only petitions brought against the
government as a sovereign by citizens, rather than filings brought against the
government as an employer.361 As Justice Scalia admitted, such a rule would
undoubtedly involve some level of ambiguity in application; but it would, at
the very least, provide a limiting principle with greater relevance to the
underlying right than the Free Speech Clause’s public-private speech
distinction.362
So in Guarnieri, the Court began the difficult process of exhuming distinct
Petition and Free Speech Clauses from the Constitution and wrestling with the
implications of that history for the petition right in the context of executive
and judicial petitioning. The Court was receptive to the history and relied on it
to clarify its doctrine, but pragmatic concerns brought about by earlier
decisions and the parties’ own concessions—the parties had litigated the case on
the assumption that the grievance and lawsuit were petitions363—dampened
the Court’s reformist spirit.
The Court has yet to address this history in the context of legislative
petitioning or lobbying, and courts have begun to speculate that the history
could have important effects on the doctrine.364 Because access to legislatures
was of particular concern to the right to petition and because the doctrine
around legislative petitioning is less developed, legislative petitioning and
lobbying could provide a ripe area for a future Court to develop an
independent Petition Clause doctrine. The following sections explore the
implications of this contextualized interpretation for the petition right as
applied to legislative advocacy and lobbying.

357. Id. at 2502-03.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 2503-04.
360. Id. at 2505-06.
361. Id. at 2506-07.
362. Id. at 2506.
363. Id. at 2492, 2494 (majority opinion).
364. See, e.g., We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 145 (Rogers, J.,
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III. Implications for the Doctrine
A. Contours of a Contextualized Right to Petition
The contours of the right to petition might appear less anomalous if one
recalls that the right predated the invention of American elections by hundreds
of years. Unlike the Free Speech Clause, a text often described as having
electoral concerns at its core,365 the Petition Clause protected a form of
engagement with government wholly distinct from the majoritarian
mechanism of the vote. Although lost to our understanding of constitutional
law today,366 the historical distinction between civil rights and political rights
provides a helpful frame to begin to establish the right to petition as more than
mere extension of the franchise. Courts in nineteenth-century America
recognized a distinction between “civil rights”—or the rights afforded all
inhabitants of the United States, regardless of station or demographic—and
“political rights,” or the rights afforded elites in society to allow for
participation in the political process.367 The latter category included the rights
to vote, to hold public office, and to serve on juries, while the former included a
broad range of rights and freedoms, including the freedom of speech, freedom
to worship, the right to contract, the right to hold property, and the right to
sue and be sued.368 The distinction between civil and political rights was used
as a means to justify and explain the extension of these rights to some classes of
individuals and not others.369 To nineteenth-century Americans, it was not the
case that white male landholders held all of the rights and that others held none
but rather that different classes of individuals held different sets of rights.370
Although women, free African Americans, Native Americans, and the foreign
born suffered extensive injustice and subjugation during this period and
beyond, these groups were in some instances at least nominally extended the
same civil rights as others. These demographics did exercise property and

365. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
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contract rights, as well as bring suits in court.371 White male landholders, on
the other hand, enjoyed civil rights as well as the political power of the
franchise.372
Historically, the right to petition afforded not a political right but a “civil”
right and was open to all inhabitants equally.373 Exercise of the right was not
limited to the elite but was afforded to the politically powerful and powerless
alike.374 Jury service, voting, and holding elected office all involved
majoritarian decisionmaking and hewed closely to the structure and function
of the political process. By contrast, petitioning constituted more than a mere
extension of these political rights. Like other civil rights, the right to petition
afforded individuals the ability to engage with government even in the absence
of the franchise and without the consideration of political power generally at
issue in the electoral process.
In addition to functioning as a civil right, the right to petition was also an
individual right. Some scholars, including Akhil Amar, have argued that the
text and structure of the Petition Clause reveal a particularly majoritarian
core.375 By contrast, the Court has recently taken the position that the right to
petition is an individual right and not a “collective” or majoritarian right.376
This divergence between the Court and the scholarly literature is likely due to
the Court’s conclusion that the Petition Clause is wholly distinct from the
Assembly Clause that precedes it.377 Other readings of the First Amendment,
Amar’s included, lean heavily on the collective language of the Assembly
Clause in articulating the collective and majoritarian nature of the right to
petition.378 In addition to conjoining assembly and petition, Amar reads “the
people” of the First Amendment as an invocation of popular sovereignty and
an echo of the Founding-era calls for convention. Although the text and
structure of the Petition Clause might support Amar’s interpretation, the
historical record largely supports the minority and individual view. While the
petition process served as a vehicle for social organization and mobilization of
many marginalized groups,379 the petition right was in the main a tool for
371. Amar, supra note 370, at 1164.
372. See id.
373. AHKIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 30 (1998)
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individuals and minorities.380 The phrase “the people” in what became the First
Amendment largely echoed the broad language of state constitutions, which
provided the right broadly to all “people.” Moreover, as Amar has recognized
elsewhere, the drafters of the First Amendment rejected the right of
instruction, or the ability to bind lawmakers to majority will, describing
petitioning as a process distinct from instruction.381 Rather, the right
contained a strong quasi-adjudicative component and often served as a stopgap
measure to remedy injuries for which no clear cause of action existed.382
Legislatures were able to resolve by statute what courts did not have the ability
to resolve through existing law, and litigants often converted complaints into
petitions in order to receive redress.383 In this way, as well as others, the
historical petition right served as a platform for minority voice in the
lawmaking process.
What the history of petitioning reveals is that the right to petition has
more in common with the right to procedural due process than it does with
free speech.384 The historical right to petition also provided a much more
comprehensive and robust petition right than is recognized today. Similar to
the due process right that governs judicial conduct, the petition right governed
congressional procedure. The right was limited, however, to procedural
protections only; nowhere did it guarantee a favorable policy outcome or
secure substantive rights. The petition right preserved only the procedures of
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Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, building on early twentieth-century theorists Hans Kelsen
and Norberto Bobbio, propose democracy as the best protection for equality and
liberty in a pluralist society because it provides the means for collective
decisionmaking without substantive demands on outcomes. Id. Most importantly, a
proceduralist view of democracy would require not simply rights-based limitations on
majority lawmaking but also mechanisms of participation for the minority in the
lawmaking process. Id. at 459-60. Petitioning would provide one such mechanism.
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acceptance, consideration, and response385 for each petition without respect to
the political power of the petitioner.386 The petition right also shared the
principles of transparency that underlie the due process right. In compliance
with Article I’s Journal Clause,387 the process of consideration for each petition
was by default a public process, and members read each petition aloud on the
floor; included actions on petitions in the congressional record; and provided
petitioners with formal, written responses.388 The right was also guaranteed. If
Congress had jurisdiction to act on a petition and the petition was properly
filed, then it afforded that petition formal process.389 The process afforded each
petition was provided according to the merits of each petition and not
according to the political power of the petitioner. Also, as directed by the Rules
Clause of Article I,390 Congress established formal rules that governed the
consideration of petitions and published those rules in the formal procedural
manuals for each house.391
However, the historical right to petition protected a substantially
narrower right than that recognized by the Court today. In particular, the
historical right concerned direct engagement with government only. The right
to petition, unlike the right of free speech, concerned legislative advocacy
directed toward government and solely through specific, formal channels. Any
broader advocacy, even advocacy directed ultimately at legislative reform
through electoral action or otherwise, that utilized channels outside those

385. Stephen Higginson has argued persuasively that the colonists’ outrage over the British

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Crown’s failure to respond to their petitions lends strong support to the theory that
the Petition Clause required a response. Higginson, supra note 34, at 155; see also AMAR,
supra note 373, at 31 (“[T]he right to petition implied a corresponding congressional
duty to respond, at least with some kind of hearing.”). Hundreds of years of past
practice lend support also, wherein colonial, state, and federal legislatures expended
valuable resources reading petitions into the record, providing the petitions with a fair
hearing, and deciding to grant or deny the petition. See supra Part I.A. Given the
extensive support for such a theory, it comes as some surprise that Higginson identifies
the gag rule debates of the 1830s and 1840s, enacting a blanket ban on all antislavery
petitions, as the “abrupt” end of the right to petition. See Higginson, supra note 34, at
165. Not only does this presumption generalize the contours of a constitutional right
from a few highly controversial debates in Congress, it ignores two contrary points:
First, it was hardly the death of the petition right; Congress upheld its obligation to
respond to petitions for over one hundred years following the gag rule debates. See
Schneer, supra note 172, at 18. Second, like the Revolution, the failure of the petition
process over the issue of slavery was followed by war about twenty years later when
the South attacked Fort Sumter in Spring of 1861.
See supra Part I.A.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
See supra Part I.A.
See id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
See supra Part I.A.
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established by government—including speech directed at the public
marketplace, newspaper articles, pamphlets, and even protest—would likely
fall outside of the Petition Clause’s protections. This is not to say that such
action would fail to obtain any constitutional protections whatsoever. As core
political speech, these actions would likely implicate the Free Speech Clause,
and it is entirely likely that the Free Speech Clause would have provided a
more appropriate framework to analyze earlier Petition Clause challenges.
However, the relationship between the speech and petition rights, especially
when the two come into conflict, is in need of future scholarly attention. Much
of the Petition Clause doctrine to date has assumed these rights to be
coextensive, largely because the Court has often referred to them
interchangeably, without any real analysis of how the two rights can and
should interact.392
B. Implications for the Doctrine
The historical petition right could begin to provide a strengthened, but
narrowed, framework to structure future Petition Clause analysis. The impact
that a contextualized right to petition could have on our Petition Clause
doctrine is twofold: unsettling393 and unbundling.
392. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491-92 (2011). Once the Court

begins to address this question head on, it could have drastic implications for the
doctrine. The relationship between free speech rights and other equivalent rights, like
due process for court proceedings, is complicated, and free speech rights are often seen
as wholly curtailed by the demands of competing rights. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884, 889-90 (2009) (developing a distinctive doctrine for
campaign finance in the context of judicial elections because of the procedural due
process concerns at issue in courts); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1070-71
(1991) (noting that attorneys’ free speech rights inside and outside of court are properly
circumscribed by ethical restrictions that preserve the integrity of judicial functions);
see also Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession : Constraints on Lawyers’
First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998).
393. Unsettling, as I use the term here, is not equivalent to “unsettlement theory” as
developed by Louis Seidman to describe the Court’s role in “unsettl[ing]” wins and
losses during the political process. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2001).
There have been no real wins or losses through the political process here because
taken-for-granted assumptions have likely preempted the question. Rather, unsettling
here refers to an attempt to suspend and interrogate the doxa, “the world of tradition
experienced as a ‘natural world’ and taken for granted.” PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF
A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) (1972).
Unsettling here means the constitution of a “field of opinion” or a “critique which
brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation.” Id. at 168.
Unsettling is important because “[t]he political function of classifications is never more
likely to pass unnoticed than in the case of relatively undifferentiated social
formations, in which the prevailing classificatory system encounters no rival or
antagonistic principle.” Id. at 164.
1
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An important contribution of a clarified petition right would be to
unsettle the presumption that the Supreme Court has held definitively that the
Petition Clause protects all forms of lobbying. This presumption has led to
confusion in the doctrine and a lack of reflection in application of the First
Amendment and has frustrated efforts to regulate lobbying.394 Many courts
now simply assume without analysis that petitioning and lobbying are
synonymous.395 In a fairly recent example, the D.C. Circuit struck down a
Department of Commerce regulation, promulgated in response to an Obama
Administration presidential memorandum, banning registered lobbyists from
serving on certain advisory commissions on the ground that it was an
unconstitutional condition on the lobbyists’ Petition Clause rights.396 In
support of the court’s presumption that lobbying was protected under the
Petition Clause, Judge Tatel, writing for the court, cited to a single 1968 D.C.
Circuit opinion that implicated the Petition Clause only tangentially.397
Rather, the 1968 opinion addressed whether the freedom of speech protected
the right of a newspaper to publish documents stolen from a lobbying firm by
one of the firm’s employees.398 The two-page opinion referenced the Petition
Clause only once, when discussing whether the stolen documents would
implicate the public interest.399 In dicta, the opinion presumed, without
analysis or support, that any lobbyist attempting to persuade Congress,
presumably by any means, exercises her right to petition and, therefore, the
exercise of that right must also fall into the public interest.400 In drafting Autor,
the D.C. Circuit relied on dicta from that single 1968 opinion, strengthened no
doubt by the Obama Administration’s concession that lobbying is protected by
the Petition Clause, to strike down the ban. Given the nearly ubiquitous
presumption that lobbying must be protected under the Petition Clause,401 the
decision prompted little outcry. The Obama Administration declined to
petition for certiorari and, instead, quickly amended its policies on lobbyist
public service. Contrary to the government’s concession in Autor, the Supreme
Court has yet to resolve the issue of whether the Petition Clause protects
lobbying. Both a closer examination of the current doctrine and recognition of
the history could begin to highlight the lack of foundation to this assumption.
Second, a contextualized petition right would force an unbundling of the
activities we currently conflate into the term “lobbying.” A close interrogation

394. See supra Part II.B.
395. See Autor v. Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
396. Id. at 177-78.
397. See id. at 182.
398. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
399. Id. at 491.
400. See id.
401. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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reveals that lobbying is not one single practice but an amalgam of a broad
range of advocacy practices, some triggering more constitutional concern than
others.402 The conflation of these advocacy practices into a single term has led
some scholars to suggest that “lobbying” ought to obtain strengthened First
Amendment protection or, at the very least, protection under a First
Amendment “penumbra” because a “bundle” of practices necessarily implicates
a “bundle” of First Amendment protections. Unbundling “lobbying” into a clear
articulation of what advocacy practice is at issue in a particular case could
bring much-needed clarity to our scholarship and doctrine.
In particular, unbundling could begin to clarify important distinctions
between speech, petitioning, and lobbying. Cases like Noerr, which addressed
the constitutional protections of a lobbying campaign directed at the public
through speeches and the press,403 would fall under the Free Speech Clause,
rather than the Petition Clause. Given that the Court has already conflated the
speech and petition doctrines in these areas, the substantive impact of
converting these to free speech cases, including the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
would be negligible. Clarity in the doctrine could, however, allow the Court to
develop an independent framework specific to the particular needs and
functions of the petition right. Second, a contextualized petition right could
provide enough structure to support an independent Petition Clause doctrine.
As in Guarnieri, the Court has often reflected on history in developing its First
Amendment jurisprudence and the broader concerns structuring its free speech
analysis often source from this historical reflection.404 A contextualized
petition right could provide structure and a limiting principle to the doctrine
and, most importantly, prevent the Court from again conflating petitioning
with speech. Moreover, as noted, a distinct Petition Clause doctrine would
provide the analytic space to articulate the relationship between the Petition
and Free Speech Clauses, no longer assuming they are coextensive simply
because of prior doctrinal conflation.
Although complete analysis of the implications of a contextualized
petition right for our current doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, the
balance of this Subpart will provide a few examples as illustrations of how the
right could impact past and future issues in our lobbying and petitioning
doctrine. Part III.B.1 looks backward to explain a longstanding puzzle at the
402. To provide some examples: “lobbying” that consists of public-directed advocacy during

an election, even aimed at influencing legislative outcomes, would fall into the heart of
the Free Speech Clause; “lobbying” consisting of direct engagement with government
through the formal petition process would fall under Petition Clause protections;
“lobbying” consisting of campaign contributions would fall under the Free Speech
Clause and the Buckley doctrine; whereas “lobbying” consisting of threats and bribes
would obtain no protections whatsoever.
403. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129, 138
(1961).
404. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2499 (2011).
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heart of lobbying law that the historical petition right might resolve.
Part III.B.2 describes issues looming on the horizon for our lobbying doctrine,
identified in recent election law scholarship, which a contextualized petition
right could avoid. The following Part, Part IV below, looks beyond the current
doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of our current lobbying system under
a contextualized petition right.
1.

Making sense of contingency fee contracts

The core of lobbying law has long held a puzzle that a contextualized
petition right could resolve. For the past seventy years, the Court has raised the
possibility of First Amendment concerns when faced with the slightest
restriction on lobbying activity. Belying these constitutional considerations,
for much of this nation’s history, legislatures and courts have criminalized
lobbying and voided lobbying contracts as against public policy without
mention of the First Amendment. Zephyr Teachout recently crafted a careful
and thoughtful review of this history, concluding that the distinction between
earlier cases treating lobbying as a criminal act and later cases invoking First
Amendment protections was rooted in a shift in both contract and
constitutional law from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries.405 As Teachout
describes, the turn of the twentieth century brought a shift in the courts’ usage
of contract enforcement as a means to legislate in preservation of public
policy.406 In the early 1900s, criminal law, specifically bribery charges, became
the primary tool for courts to confront the corruption concerns raised by
lobbying contingency fee contracts.407 It was this shift in doctrine, Teachout
argues, that explains the difference in treatment of lobbying from the earlier
contract cases to the Petition Clause cases like Harriss.408
The history of petitioning provides an alternative, simplified solution to
the apparent tension in the lobbying doctrine. The right to petition, as it was
exercised in Harriss, protects formal engagement with government. The right
does not protect, however, efforts to circumvent and undermine that formal
process by engagement with Congress through informal means.409 Contracts
struck down by the courts include services such as “procuring legislative
action . . .by personal solicitation,” the sale of “personal influence to obtain the
passage of a private law,” and an agreement that a lobbyist would “use his
influence to ensure the passage of a law.”410 A court would just as likely void a

405. Teachout, supra note 3, at 6.
406. Id. at 17-19.
407. Id. at 17.
408. Id. at 17-19.
409. Id. at 19.
410. Id. at 7, 8, 10.
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contract between a lawyer and a client for litigation services that included
intentionally violating the established rules of civil procedure and using
personal relationships to secure additional access to the judge to discuss the
case, as it would void a contract for similar services in the context of Congress.
In striking down contracts for lobbying services, the courts were explicit,
however, that contracts for services in circumvention of the formal petition
process by engaging with Congress through informal means were voidable,
while contracts for representation during the formal petition and legislative
process were not.411 The courts made clear that the latter contracts would not
be against public policy and might even obtain constitutional protection.412
While Teachout’s explanation for the tension in the doctrine could hold
true, the contextualized petition right provides a simpler explanation: the
Petition Clause protects only that conduct in comportment with the formal
process and not efforts to engage informally with Congress. Contracts for
services that circumvent the petition process would not obtain constitutional
protection.
2.

Lobbying is not the new campaign finance

Finally, an increasing number of scholars, primarily from the election law
community, have begun to speculate that the Court’s steady dismantling of the
campaign finance regulatory framework under the Free Speech Clause
doctrine of Buckley v. Valeo413 and especially its progeny, Citizens United v.
FEC,414 raises strong concerns about the constitutionality of any lobbying
regulation, including our current disclosure regimes.
Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald Levin, and Theodore Ruger first raised the issue
in their chapter in the lobbying bible, The Lobbying Manual.415 As they describe
it, the foundational regulatory scheme governing lobbyists, the Lobbying
Disclosure Act, “is primarily justified on the ground that it combats political
corruption,” and, therefore, the disclosure provisions that compelled lobbyists
to share data on quarterly expenditures could run afoul of the Buckley doctrine
if not narrowly tailored enough to address quid pro quo corruption.416 In
particular, Garrett, Levin, and Ruger took issue with the fact that the lobbying
expenditure disclosure requirements did not require disclosure of enough
information, including more detailed information tying expenditures to
411. See id. at 9.
412. See id. at 19.
413. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
414. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
415. Elizabeth Garrett et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by the Lobbying Disclosure Act, in THE

LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE
supra note 183, at 197, 199.
416. Id. at 201.
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specific lawmaker targets, which they argue would more closely target
disclosure of a quid pro quo relationship.417 The absence of a clear tie between
the disclosure requirements and the ability to discern a quid pro quo
relationship left the regime on a shaky foundation under the Buckley doctrine,
assuming a corruption-based state interest.418
Following the Citizens United decision in 2010 and its constriction of the
corruption state interest, Rick Hasen published a comprehensive treatment of
lobbying law, declaring all future lobbying regulation under fire and offering a
new state interest in “promoting national economic welfare” as a motivation
for future regulation.419 If lobbying regulation had been on shaky footing
before the Court issued Citizens United, Hasen declared that the lower courts
would use the “[Supreme] Court’s new deregulatory campaign finance
jurisprudence” to steadily dismantle all forms of lobbying regulation.420
In support, Hasen provided two examples: First, the Second Circuit in
Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield applied Citizens United to strike down a
Connecticut law that banned campaign contributions from lobbyists, the
lobbyists’ spouses, and the lobbyists’ dependent children to candidates for state
office and banned lobbyists from soliciting contributions, or fundraising, on
behalf of a candidate.421 Second, the Southern District of Ohio in Brinkman v.
Budish applied Citizens United to strike down an Ohio revolving door ban that
prohibited former state lawmakers and their staff from appearing before the
state legislature as lobbyists for a year after leaving public service.422 To Hasen,
these decisions marked the rising tide of challenges that lobbying regulation
faced after Citizens United.423
Hasen’s article also followed on the heels of a number of election law
scholars, most prominently Richard Briffault and Heather Gerken, who
declared lobbying to be the “new campaign finance” and called for increased
attention to the topic in the burgeoning field of election law.424 This
declaration was not simply the reformer’s spirit looking for a more fruitful
avenue of reform. Gerken described the two as inseparable, both factually and
theoretically:

417. Id. at 201-02.
418. Id.
419. Hasen, supra note 3, at 197.
420. Id. at 195.
421. Id. at 195-96; see also Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 192-93 (2d Cir.

2010).
422. Hasen, supra note 3, at 196; see also Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (S.D.
Ohio 2010).
423. Hasen, supra note 3, at 195.
424. See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance : Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 105, 105 (2008); Gerken, supra note 5, at 1155.
1
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Money is just a visible symptom of the hydraulics of political influence. If we
think about campaign finance in these terms, it is hard to imagine why anyone
would neglect lobbying. It is the other natural means of seeking political
influence. As long as lobbying and campaign finance work in tandem with one
another, we should not study one without studying the other. Both are simply
different means to achieve the same set of political ends. They are not isolated
systems that are separate from one another.425

Briffault shared Gerken’s perspective that lobbying and campaign finance
were largely similar in that they are both “vital to representative democracy,”
involve information and communication, raise common concerns about
unequal wealth and unequal influence in the political process, and inspire
concerns over improper influence or corruption.426 Briffault, however, went
on to develop some of the distinctions between lobbying and campaign finance,
including noting some important differences in the role of political equality
between the two practices:
Political equality plays a far smaller role in lobbying regulation. . . .
Operationally, it is difficult to imagine a set of rules that could give each adult
resident citizen an equal say on every issue subject to lobbying without choking
off lobbying itself. Capping the amounts an individual or group could spend
either on hiring a lobbyist or on lobbying personally would cut directly into the
amount of lobbying the individual or group could undertake.427

Rather than claiming that egalitarianism held no place in the context of
lobbying, Briffault called for a form of equality theory that comports with the
specific concerns of the petition process.428 Unlike the equality of influence
generally espoused by election law scholars in the context of elections and the
value of “one person, one vote,” however, Briffault recognized that engaging
with the lawmaking process demanded a different kind of equality—namely, a
procedural equality, akin to equality of access to courts:
All citizens have a formal equal right to seek to lobby their legislature, and all
individuals, organizations, or interest groups affected by a legislative proposal
should have an equal opportunity to present their case to the legislature. . . . This,
however, is not a matter of the political equality of individuals per se, but of
structuring fair competition among contending interest groups.429

Given the dearth of scholarship focused on lobbying and petitioning, the
growing attention by the election law community to the issue of lobbying and
lobbying regulation is most welcome. But as earlier parts describe, it is unclear
whether the election law frames of the electoral process and the Free Speech

425. Gerken, supra note 5, at 1162.
426. Briffault, supra note 424, at 107-08.
427. Id. at 113.
428. Id. at 113-14.
429. Id. at 114.
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Clause, as well as the community’s ongoing debates over political equality430
and political corruption,431 are appropriate for the particularities of the law of
lobbying. Our current lobbying system is no doubt entrenched deeply in our
system of campaign finance. As Briffault recognized, however, the important
questions and concerns in the context of petitioning during the lawmaking
process are different from and often in tension with the concerns of elections
and campaign finance.432 Most notably, the electoral process serves as a
mechanism of representation that aims to capture the will of the majority,
while the petition process provides a counterpoint mechanism of
representation for minorities and individuals to engage in the lawmaking
process.
The history of petitioning and the specific text of the Petition Clause
counsel against conflation of the electoral and the legislative processes. These
two contexts present wholly different dynamics. Elections rely on a
majoritarian decision rule to select the composition of Congress, a rule
necessarily dependent upon equality of influence, and involve political speech
that falls into the core of the Free Speech Clause and its “marketplace of ideas”
model. By contrast, the mechanism of petitioning rejected a majoritarian
decision rule and instead established a platform for engagement during the
lawmaking process, like that of a court, to give voice to individual and
minority grievances. Unlike speech in the context of elections, petitioning is
not directed at influencing public discourse, electoral outcomes, or the

430. Id. at 113-14.
431. Id. at 108. One potential exception is the theory of institutional corruption developed

by Lawrence Lessig. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: THE CORRUPTION OF EQUALITY
AND THE STEPS TO END IT 238 (rev. ed. 2015). Unlike other theories of political
corruption, Lessig’s institutional corruption focuses on systemic corruption, or ways
in which intended mechanisms of representation are undermined or “corrupted” by
competing mechanisms. Id. at 18. His paradigmatic example is that of the “green
primary,” or a private market for campaign fundraising that decides which candidates
are able to run in an election based on how much the campaigns can raise from the
wealthy. Id. at 11-16. Citizens can still technically vote for the candidates selected by
the green primary, but the structure of our electoral system is “corrupted” by this
earlier process that makes our votes less functional. Id. Scholars of the First
Amendment might recognize strong parallels between this instance of institutional
corruption and that of Robert Post’s “electoral integrity.” See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS
DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 60 (2014); see also Doe v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 198 (2010) (recognizing the state interest of “electoral integrity” in
the context of ballot initiatives). However, Lessig’s theory of institutional corruption
sweeps more broadly than elections and could capture some of the dynamics of our
lobbying system as well. Similar to the green primary that corrupts our intended
electoral system, lobbying is an institutional corruption of the petition process
envisioned by the Petition Clause.
432. Briffault, supra note 424, at 109-10.
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marketplace of ideas.433 Given these differences, conflation of the mechanism
of the vote and the mechanism of petitioning makes little sense and could
undermine efforts to design and enact a system of public engagement with the
lawmaking process that satisfies the particular countermajoritarian function
that petitioning was intended to serve.
This conflation also does not bode well for clarity in the doctrine. Without
much reasoning or support, the lower courts have begun to assume that the
Buckley doctrine applies to all lobbying regulation. Such an approach overlooks
critical constitutional distinctions between regulation of the electoral process
and regulation of the lawmaking process. Hasen highlights one poignant
example in Brinkman v. Budish,434 where the Southern District of Ohio applied
Citizens United to strike down an Ohio revolving door ban—a law that
prevented former state lawmakers and their staff from petitioning the
lawmaking process for one year after public service.435 Without reflection on
the important distinctions between Brinkman and Green Party of Connecticut,
Hasen relies on these two cases to declare a new era for all attempts to regulate
lobbying post-Citizens United.436 While Hasen’s concern over judicial
deregulation might ring true in the context of lobbyist participation in the
campaign finance system—the area of regulation challenged in Green Party of
Connecticut—the ban on petitioning challenged in Brinkman presents an
entirely different question.
Buckley and its progeny have developed as a doctrine specific to speech and,
in particular, speech and the financing of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns.437 This doctrine has clear application to a First Amendment
challenge to the Connecticut campaign finance laws challenged in Green Party
of Connecticut v. Garfield.438 By contrast, the ban on petitioning challenged in
Brinkman holds no clear relationship to campaign finance or the electoral
process whatsoever.439 While Citizens United included some loose language
433. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) (“The right to petition

434.
435.
436.
437.

438.
439.

allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and
their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of
ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas
and human affairs.”).
Hasen, supra note 3, at 196; see also Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (S.D.
Ohio 2010).
Hasen, supra note 3, at 196.
Id. at 195-96.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that provisions limiting
the amount which any individual could spend independent of a particular candidate
impermissibly abridged freedom of speech); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319
(2010) (holding that the government may not, under the First Amendment, suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity).
616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir. 2010).
Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
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regarding lobbying law,440 nothing in that case dealt with lobbying regulation,
petitioning, or the Petition Clause. Rather than ushering in a new era for all
lobbying regulation, it is likely that Brinkman was simply an outlier case that
wrongly applied a free speech doctrine to a Petition Clause case.
The application of Buckley and its progeny to regulation of the petition
process is likely a mistake of the ligation process. As Garrett, Levin, and Ruger
observed, as campaign finance and lobbying have become all the more
entwined, most governments describe their lobbying regulations as motivated
by an interest in preventing corruption. When asked by the Southern District
of Ohio in Brinkman why it had passed its lobbying ban, the Ohio government
proffered that it had passed the law to prevent corruption and the appearance
of corruption. Among other corruption concerns, Ohio wanted to prevent the
corruption that would occur from former legislators “using their close
relationships with former colleagues and special knowledge of the legislative
process to gain access as lobbyists in ways that provide them unequal access to
public officials [in comparison] to that of others petitioning the
government.”441 In interpreting whether Ohio had met the proper standard to
prove the corruption state interest, the court turned to the Buckley doctrine—
specifically Citizens United—the only doctrine that defines the corruption state
interest.442 In determining whether unequal access to lawmakers during the
lawmaking process would constitute corruption, the court responded that
under Citizens United, a case that noted explicitly that unequal access was not
corruption, it would not.443 Not only does conflation of campaign finance and
lobbying in the election law scholarship risk missing the theoretical nuances
specific to petitioning, it risks a similar dismantling of lobbying regulation
under the Free Speech Clause as that fated to campaign finance reform.
IV. Contextualizing Our Current Lobbying System
A. Our Current Lobbying System
Although lobbying and money in politics are increasingly vilified for
“corrupting” our political process, little empirical evidence exists to support

440. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
441. Brinkman, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (alteration in original).
442. Id.
443. Id. It also bears noting that, even if a litigant should raise a challenge to regulation of

the petition process under Buckley, the Court could always hold the doctrine inapposite
on other grounds. Specifically, regulation of the petition process is better suited to the
campaign finance doctrine developed for the judiciary, in the context of due process
rights, and distinguished explicitly from Buckley in Citizens United. See Citizens United,
588 U.S. at 360.
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the conclusion that undue influence causes lawmakers to shift their votes. 444
Despite the best efforts of generations of political scientists, empirical studies of
Congress have found only indeterminate evidence that campaign
contributions and political power lead to more favorable policy outcomes. The
few studies that have focused on lobbying exclusively have reached similar
conclusions, finding little correlation between positive substantive outcomes
and lobbying expenditures.445 The steady influx of millions of dollars in
campaign contributions and billions of dollars expended on lobbying reminds
empiricists, however, that rational political donors continue to find a reason to
invest in lobbying and campaign contributions. As a consequence, despite years
of dissatisfying findings, political scientists continue to try to find an empirical
connection between resources and influence on outcomes. This struggle has
only intensified in the years following Buckley v. Valeo and the Court’s use of
the doctrine to steadily dismantle Congress’s ability to regulate the political
process and to narrow “undue influence” to quid pro quo transactions.
By contrast, it has been settled for decades that Congress affords greater
consideration and access to the lawmaking process to those who have provided
campaign contributions and to the politically powerful. Political theorists have
long speculated that contributions and political power bought access in
Congress.446 But starting in the 1980s, empiricists dissatisfied with the inability
to find a correlation between political money and roll call votes turned their
methods to study other measures of influence on the lawmaking process.447
Using survey data that charted time usage by a random sample of members of
the House from the ninety-fifth Congress combined with FEC data on
campaign contributions, Laura Langbein found that PAC contributions
significantly increased the likelihood that an interest group would gain access
to a lawmaker with the “cost” of lawmaker time ranging from $6400 for less
than twenty-five minutes to $72,300 for an hour with a lawmaker.448 A few
years later, Richard Hall and Frank Wayman used interviews and markup
records to study the relationship between PAC contributions and the allocation

444. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J.

ECON. PERSP. 105, 116 (2003).
445. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS,

WHO LOSES, AND WHY 25 (2009).
446. J. David Gopoian, What Makes PACs Tick? : An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of
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Economic Interest Groups, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259, 262 (1984); James F. Herndon, Access,
Record, and Competition as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional
Campaigns, 44 J. POL. 996, 997 (1982); Alexander Heard, Money and Politics 14-15
(Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 242, 1956).
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of access and attention to an issue in three congressional committees.449 Hall
and Wayman found a strong correlation between campaign contributions to
members already ideologically aligned with an issue and increased access to
those members and increased attention by those members to the donor’s
issue.450
More recent studies have confirmed earlier results. A randomized field
experiment of 191 congressional offices revealed that senior policymakers
made themselves available for a meeting three-to-four times more often if the
person trying to schedule the meeting was an identified campaign
contributor.451 The presumption that access to lawmakers is contingent on a
relationship with that member, built through campaign contributions and
other forms of electoral power, has become profoundly uncontroversial.
Taking the correlation between access and political power as given, political
scientists have now started to focus on analyzing stratification within
politically powerful groups. They are finding even further entrenchment of
who gains access to lawmakers as the costs of building relationships with
members increase over time.452 Unlike campaign contributions affecting
policy outcomes, the fact that Congress affords access and process unequally
and based on political power has become settled doctrine in political science.
It is perhaps even less controversial to claim that those who are able to
muster the political capital to secure access to lawmakers are afforded wholly
arbitrary, informal, and unequal process. As Langbein’s findings demonstrate,
the amount of time spent with a lawmaker correlates closely with the political
power of the individual securing the meeting, so the less politically powerful
can expect far less time and, by inference, less process devoted to their issues as
a result.453 The little process that petitioners can expect, if any, is incredibly
informal, and no standards exist to provide minimum requirements or ethical
guidelines.454
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By contrast to our historical petition process, which was governed by
formal rules, public process, and nonarbitrary consideration, our current
lobbying system consists entirely of informal and opaque norms, customs, and
practices. An individual who wants to engage with the lawmaking process in
Congress could obtain a meeting with a member or her staff at which the
individual could deliver her “one-pager,” a customary lobbying document that
outlines the policy issue, and her “ask,” a request for specific legislative
action.455 But she could also receive no response to her request to meet—instead
she might have to meet with a member at a fundraiser for the member’s
campaign and deliver her “one-pager” and her “ask” along with her
contribution of $1000 for individuals or $2500 for a PAC.
When it comes to our lobbying system of today, no procedure is
guaranteed and there are no clear rules. Contrary to historical congressional
practice, neither chamber drafts parliamentary rules outlining the procedures
of our current lobbying system. Unlike court process, the default expectation is
that contact with the legislature will be shielded from public view, and no
public record exists to provide the due process protections that public scrutiny
affords. The informality and opacity of the lobbying system has essentially
closed the process to nonprofessionals and noninsiders.456 No government
websites document the process by which individuals may lobby Congress or
describe the formalities of lobbying consideration. The few texts to describe
the process are confined to manuals for professional lobbyists and describe an
entirely informal system of customs and norms.457 Unlike the rules of civil
procedure and other due process requirements, few laws govern the means by
which the public engages with Congress, and those that do tend to articulate
only the boundaries of the process through ethics rules, lobbying restrictions,
and criminal bribery laws.458 No formal structure exists to ensure that our
current lobbying system comports with the petition right.
B. Implications of the Petition Right for Our Lobbying System
As empirical work in political science demonstrates, Congress has
developed through our current lobbying system an informal petitioning
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(describing the process by which lobbyists who are lawyers may opt out of
professional ethics rules for lawyers).
Gelak, supra note 454, at 612-13.
Drutman et al., supra note 452, at 1-3.
See GARY J. ANDRES, LOBBYING RECONSIDERED: POLITICS UNDER THE INFLUENCE (2009);
BERTRAM J. LEVINE, THE ART OF LOBBYING: BUILDING TRUST AND SELLING POLICY (2009);
PAT LIBBY & ASSOCS., THE LOBBYING STRATEGY HANDBOOK: 10 STEPS TO ADVANCING
ANY CAUSE EFFECTIVELY (2012); ERNEST WITTENBERG & ELISABETH WITTENBERG, HOW
TO WIN IN WASHINGTON: VERY PRACTICAL ADVICE ABOUT LOBBYING, THE GRASSROOTS,
AND THE MEDIA (2d ed. 1994); Gelak, supra note 454, at 605-22.
See TASK FORCE ON FED. LOBBYING LAWS, supra note 31, at 4-5.

1198

Lobbying and the Petition Clause
68 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2016)

mechanism that is opaque and unorthodox and that provides preferential
access to the lawmaking process to the politically powerful. Our current
lobbying system has become mundane and routinized inside Congress as
members engage daily with constituents, lobbyists, and other interested parties
to gather information and hear grievances. Although Congress has not passed a
statute that limits the right to petition, it has developed an extensive system of
informal procedures that does just that. These informal procedures constitute
what Francis Lieber termed the “common law” of Congress and what I term,
borrowing from recent work by Victoria Nourse, ”legislative common law.”459
Similar to the means by which the rules of civil procedure and laws of evidence
constitute due process in courts, it is through the enactment of this legislative
common law that Congress constitutes the petition process.
By affording access to the lawmaking process unequally, conditioned on
the political power of the petitioner, and on an arbitrary, informal, and opaque
basis, Congress is violating the Petition Clause. Rather than establishing a
mechanism for petitioning that comports with the right, Congress has
essentially conflated the functions and principles of the electoral process into
the lawmaking process. The electoral process, and the core principles of the
speech right that protect it, functions to foster a free and competitive
marketplace of ideas where the most popular ideas rise above the din, shape
electoral conduct, and are then resolved through a majoritarian decision rule.
Petitioning, by contrast, provided a mechanism for individuals and minorities
to have a voice in the lawmaking process that more closely resembled the
procedural due process right afforded litigants in court. The right was
individual and protected certain procedural guarantees, including
consideration and response. In conflating these two distinct mechanisms of
representation, Congress has carried forward the majoritarian decision rule
intended to resolve public decisionmaking during the electoral process into the
distinctive process of petitioning. Put simply, our current lobbying system
violates the right to petition.
1.

Remedies

To resolve Congress’s current violation of the right to petition, I propose
that Congress at minimum formalize the petition process and establish
procedures whereby it would afford public and equal access to the lawmaking
process. In many ways, such a system would resemble an Administrative
Procedure Act460 for Congress. Establishing such a system would require more
than our current lobbying registration and disclosure regime. In place of our
459. Victoria F. Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 362

(2014) (citing FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 188-89 (3d ed.
1877)).
460. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-59 (2014).
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current Lobbying Disclosure Act,461 Congress should enact, either through
rules or by statute, formal guidelines to make transparent and predictable the
consideration it will afford. This proposed solution would not require any
prohibitions or lobbying bans. Rather, Congress could regulate both the
petition process and efforts to circumvent that process through “lobbying” by
preempting the field and establishing comprehensive regulation that governs
affirmatively when and how the public may engage with Congress.
Ideally, this comprehensive system would resemble the petition process
that served our legislatures well for over a hundred years and that the Framers
protected with the Petition Clause. As described, this quasi-adjudicative process
considered grievances submitted by petitioners as formal filings, which
contained a statement of grievance, arguments in support of the grievance,
signatures in support of the petition, and occasionally supplemental materials
like proposed legislative language or other supportive evidence. By contrast to
contemporary legislative practice, members would always know of the source
of proposed statutory language and other materials introduced through the
petition process. Members would read these petitions aloud on the floor of
Congress and then refer the petition to the appropriate committee, executive
agency, or adjudicative body.462 Whatever the substantive outcome, Congress
would afford petitioners formal consideration of their petitions, and action on
the petition would become part of the congressional record.463 As lobbying
drives the congressional agenda today,464 Congress could allow petitions to
drive the legislative agenda in place of our current lobbying system. In
response to voluminous numbers of similar petitions, Congress could resolve
the issue as it has historically by either consolidating the petitions or by
creating new government institutions to process the petitions. In fact,
Congress dealt with problems of volume historically by creating much of the
administrative state and specialized courts, including the Patent and
Trademark Office and the Court of Claims, for example. Congress could
resolve frivolous petitions through summary dismissal.
By establishing the petition process affirmatively, Congress could also
clarify what constitutes improper procedure and access. Congress could then
regulate engagement with Congress and lawmakers outside of the formalized
petition process through disclosure and ethics rules, including recusal rules
similar to those that govern judges. This is not to say that lawmakers could no
longer engage with the public. A conversation at a town hall to clarify a
461. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-14 (2014).
462. See supra Part I.B.
463. See id.
464. Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Money, Priorities, and Stalemate : How Lobbying Affects Public
1

Policy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 194, 201-02 (2014) (finding a significant correlation between the
agenda of lobbyists and the agenda of Congress and almost no correlation with the
agenda identified by the public).
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lawmaker’s policy position before an upcoming election could be ethical, and
lawmakers could still reach out to the public for hearings and other formal
processes. By contrast, listening to an individual grievance and accepting draft
statutory language to resolve that grievance at a fundraiser could be subject to
disclosure requirements, ethics restrictions, and recusal requirements.
Lawmakers would be required to disclose those all-too-common text messages
from powerful lobbyists that direct questions during hearings. To the extent
that Congress found these and other circumventions too disruptive of the
lawmaking process, Congress could begin to limit these circumventions. A
formal petition process could also allow professionalization of the
representatives who represent the public in the formal petition process. As we
now regulate lawyers who represent their clients before formal government
proceedings in courts and otherwise, we could begin to establish professional
standards and ethics restrictions for those highly trained policy experts now
employed as lobbyists. Not only would professionalization benefit the petition
process and the client, but professional lobbyists might also welcome the
heightened stature and improved public understanding of their now vilified
profession.
2.

Objections

First, adopting this proposed solution would inevitably face problems of
scale. Some historians speculate that the formal petition process died out in
Congress because lawmakers struggled to manage the sheer volume of petition
submissions as the country grew.465 This theory suffers from some yet
unexplored flaws, but the fact remains that today’s Congress represents a polity
of over 320 million individuals and tackles a host of modern regulatory issues
far more complex than in earlier centuries. Federal jurisdiction has also
expanded and with it the range of possible matters on which petitioners might
express grievances. These criticisms do not consider, however, that while
formal petitioning in Congress may have fallen by the wayside, public
engagement with Congress has not. In response to an industry that some
speculate may exceed $8 billion in expenditures per year, Congress is
necessarily spending resources and affording informal process to the public.
Congress has established a de facto petition process and is attempting to address

465. Pasley, supra note 21, at 60. There are some fundamental flaws in this theory that

current scholarship is beginning to explore, including the fact that Congress resolved
problems of scale in the petition process historically by constructing much of the
administrative state. The early congressional origins of the administrative state and
the nuanced Founding-era view of separation of powers and lawmaking have been
recently and masterfully documented. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American
Administrative Law : Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1297 (2006). The
connection between this early American institutional development and the petition
process has yet to be explored.
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scalability and complexity problems by establishing an informal, grey market
system that affords preferential access and process to the politically powerful.
There is no doubt that concerns over feasibility should inspire caution and
further discussion on questions of institutional design, but problems of scale
should not preclude reform of our lobbying system for two reasons. First, our
government has confronted and resolved problems of scale in a number of
other areas. For example, our extensive system of lower federal courts did not
exist at the Founding but has scaled appropriately in response to increased
federal jurisdiction and volume of litigants.466 Congress could summarily
dispose of frivolous motions and could consolidate duplicative motions. In
addition to simple expansion, the courts have also developed an extensive
system of procedural rules to routinize and streamline the litigation process.467
Our heavy reliance, for better or worse, on pretrial motion practice and the
settlement process to dispose of actions has been a functional solution to
problems of scale.468 Along similar lines, our administrative agencies have
developed complex and large-scale means of public engagement through the
formal notice-and-comment process. There is little that would prevent
Congress from adopting these and other similar measures to respond to issues
of scalability. Moreover, advances in technology in the twenty-first century
offer additional solutions to problems of scale not available historically.469
Second, and most importantly, issues of scale should not preclude future
reforms because our current lobbying system is constitutionally inadequate.
Preserving the status quo is simply not an option if Congress aims to comply
with its obligations under the Petition Clause.
A second objection is that this proposed solution could create tension
between the Petition Clause and other First Amendment rights, most notably
speech and association. On further reflection, however, this tension could
actually prove beneficial. The upside to a fully articulated petition process is

466. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 3-39 (First

Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed., 1999).
467. Id.; see also Edson R. Sunderland, The Machinery of Procedural Reform, 22 MICH. L. REV.
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(1992) (prescribing a number of reforms to streamline efficiency in the federal courts
in the face of rising demands on both civil and criminal dockets).
469. See, e.g., STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING
COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE 1 (2014). Project Madison, a
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that it would force the courts to begin to clarify the relationship between the
Petition Clause and the Free Speech and Association Clauses, as it has done in
other contexts. In confronting this tension elsewhere, the Supreme Court has
routinely held that limitations on speech and associational rights do not violate
the Constitution if those limitations protect government processes. To provide
three poignant examples: The Court, per Justice Scalia, upheld a law which
restricted the right to speak on the floor of a state legislature as a reasonable
protection of the lawmaking process.470 Similarly, the Court has held that a
restriction on ballot information was a reasonable regulation of the electoral
process and did not violate a challenger’s speech and associational rights.471
Kathleen Sullivan has meticulously documented the myriad restrictions on the
ability of lawyers to speak in violation of court rules upheld as reasonable
protections of the judicial process.472 If these other contexts are any indication,
any Free Speech Clause protections for lobbying will give way to the right to
petition when lobbying undermines the petition process.
Finally, some might argue that a petition right analogous to a procedural
due process right has no place in the majoritarian institution of Congress and
that, as a so-called “political branch,” Congress should be more “democratic”
than the courts. Under a simple model of democracy, the need to be responsive
to majoritarian pressures throughout the lawmaking process could justify
affording more access and consideration to those with political power. This
presupposition, however, relies on two misconceptions. First, it ignores the
key distinction that exists between the electoral process, governed by a
majoritarian-decision rule,473 and the lawmaking process, which was designed
470. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347, 2351 (2011) (“Legislative

sessions would become massive town-hall meetings if those who had a right to speak
were not limited to [lawmakers] who had a right to vote. . . . This Court has rejected the
notion that the First Amendment confers a right to use governmental mechanics to
convey a message.”); see also Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris,
782 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (delineating the distinctions between First
Amendment rights in the electoral context and those in the lawmaking context).
471. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 362-63 (1997) (“We are
unpersuaded, however, by the party’s contention that it has a right to use the ballot
itself to send a particularized message, to its candidate and to the voters, about the
nature of its support for the candidate. Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not
as forums for political expression.”).
472. Kathleen M. Sullivan, supra note 392, at 569 (“Lawyers’ freedom of speech is
constrained in many ways that no one would challenge seriously under the First
Amendment. Rules of evidence and procedure, bans on revealing grand jury
testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous pleadings, to name a few,
are examples of speech limitations that are widely accepted as functional necessities in
the administration of justice, much like rules of order in a town meeting.”).
473. This distinction tracks that drawn by Adrian Vermeule between majoritarianism writ
large, or decisions made by an electoral mass to select partisan representatives “like
bundles of issue-preferences,” and majoritarianism writ small, or “voting in a series of
single-issue referendums.” Adrian Vermeule, The Force of Majority Rule, in MAJORITY
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to be more complex than a simple majoritarian system.474 Conflation of the
electoral and lawmaking processes ignores the long history of legislatures,
including Congress, that provided formal, equal access to the lawmaking
process for individuals and minorities through the petition process475 and the
protection of that right through ratification of the Petition Clause.476 As
discussed, the drafters of the Petition Clause considered and explicitly rejected
the right to instruct representatives, whereby a majority could bind a
lawmaker to its will.477 Debates around the Petition Clause described the right
as one that was inherently individual and the petition process as a platform for
individual voices in the lawmaking process.478 Second, we need to evaluate
critically the foundations of our assumptions that legislatures are strictly
majoritarian institutions and that the absence of majoritarian legislative
outcomes undermines our Congress. A critical gaze might reveal the lack of
any foundation at all to these assumptions. Rather, our Constitution
established a republican form of government,479 and although that term is
itself ambiguous, it is well settled that a republican form of government is not a
direct democracy.480
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Conclusion
On one level, this is an article about lobbying and about the need for a
paradigm shift in how we are approaching reform. This Article’s main focus of
inquiry, however, is not simply lobbying but rather Congress, an institution
much reviled by the public and largely ignored by the legal academy. Congress
has, in some senses, fallen into an intellectual jurisdictional hole. On the one
hand, political scientists find the lawmaking process too “legal” to involve their
discipline and, on the other hand, legal scholars recoil at an institution they
envision as devoid of law and driven by politics all the way down. Our neglect
has likely contributed to the institution’s current dysfunction. It is time that we
begin to see the lawmaking process as again the domain of lawyers and open a
discussion as to the theory and law that should structure that process.
In illuminating the history and theory behind the petition process and the
Petition Clause, this Article takes an early step toward developing an
affirmative vision of how Congress should function within our constitutional
framework. In particular, this Article begins the work of articulating a
concrete vision of how Congress should engage with the public outside of the
vote. Historically, Congress engaged with the public through a formal,
nonarbitrary, transparent, and equal process called petitioning. Because the
petition process was designed to protect individuals and minorities, the process
was not contingent on the political power of the petitioner. The
unenfranchised engaged in petitioning, and lawmakers did not require a
minimum signature count to obtain review and response. We often assume
that legislatures and the lawmaking process are as majoritarian as the vote;
history provides a more nuanced view. The Framers codified the right to
petition in the First Amendment. To date, we have presupposed, often without
support or reasoning, that the current way that Congress engages with the
public—that is, our current lobbying system—is constitutionally protected by
the right to petition. But a closer look reveals that our current lobbying
system, which is informal, arbitrary, and opaque and which provides
preferential treatment to the politically powerful, provides none of the values
protected by the petition right. In failing to satisfy even the basic requirements
of the petition right, Congress is violating our right to petition.
At best, clarity in the right to petition and Congress’s obligation to the
public under that right could motivate Congress toward reform. The
legislative histories of earlier efforts at reform appear to turn on confusion
over the scope of the Petition Clause. The more cynical among us, however,
can at least hope that clarity in the petition right might stimulate the external
pressure necessary, either by the public or the courts, to bring about muchneeded reform.
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